An Indian grammar for International Studies

A little over three years ago I wrote in The Hindu that at a time when interest in India and India’s interest in the world are arguably at their highest, Indian scholarship on global issues is showing few signs of responding to this challenge and that this could well stunt India’s ability to influence the international system.

As we meet here now, at the first real convention of scholars (and practitioners) of International Studies from throughout India, we can take some comfort. A quick, albeit anecdotal, audit of the study of International Studies would suggest that the last three years have been unusually productive. So much so, that we are now, I believe, at a veritable “tipping point” in our emergence as an intellectual power in the discipline.

Stanley Hoffman, Professor of International Relations (IR) at Harvard, once famously remarked that IR was an American social science. The blinding nexus between knowledge and power (particularly stark in the case of IR in the United States) perhaps made him forget that while the first modern IR departments were created in Aberystwyth and in Geneva, thinking on international relations went back, in the case of the Indian, Chinese and other great civilizations, to well before the West even began to think of the world outside their living space.

Having absorbed the grammar of Western international relations, and transited to a phase of greater self-confidence, it is now opportune for us to also use the vocabulary of our past as a guide to the future.

2011 survey

Recovery of these Indian ideas should not be seen as part of a revivalist project or as an exercise that seeks to reify so-called Indian exceptionalism. Rather, interrogating our rich past with its deeply argumentative tradition is, as Amartya Sen put it, “partly a celebration, partly an invitation to criticality, partly a reason for further exploration, and partly also an incitement to get more people into the argument.” In the context of international relations it offers the intellectual promise of going beyond the Manichean opposition between power and principle; and between the world of ideas and norms on the one hand, and that of statecraft and even machtpolitik, on the other.

In doing so we are not being particularly subversive. A 2011 survey of American IR scholars by Foreign Policy found that 22 per cent adopted a Constructivist approach (with its privileging of ideas and identity in shaping state preferences and international outcomes), 21 per cent adopted a Liberal approach, only 16 per cent a Realist approach, and a tiny two per cent a Marxist approach. When academics were asked to “list their peers who have had the greatest influence on them and the discipline,” the most influential was Alexander Wendt, the Constructivist, and neither the Liberal, Robert Koehane, nor the Realists, Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer.

Mohandas Gandhi once said that “if all the Upanishads and all the other scriptures happened all of a sudden to be reduced to ashes, and if only the first verse in the Ishopanishad were left in the memory of the Hindus, Hinduism would live forever.” Let me make what may seem like another astounding claim, and which I hope, in the best argumentative tradition, will be heavily contested. If all the books on war and peace were to suddenly disappear from the world, and only the Mahabharata remained, it would be good enough to capture almost all the possible debates on order, justice, force and the moral dilemmas associated with choices that are made on these issues within the realm of international politics.

Uncertainty in the region

Beyond theory, we are faced with a period of extraordinary uncertainty in the international system and in our region. Multilateralism is in serious crisis. While the U.N. Security Council remains deadlocked on key issues, there is little progress on most other issues of global concern, be it trade, sustainable development or climate change. As academics, we cannot remain unconcerned about these critical failures.

Our continent is being defined and redefined over time. Regions are, after all, as much shaped by the powerful whose interests they seek to advance as by any objective reality. Whatever nomenclature we adopt, and whatever definition we accept, we are faced with, what Evan Feigenbaum and Robert Manning described as two Asias: the ‘Economic Asia’ whose $19 trillion regional economy drives global growth; the “Security Asia,” a “dysfunctional region of mistrustful powers, prone to nationalism and irredentism, escalating their territorial disputes over tiny rocks and shoals, and arming for conflict.”

The Asian Development Bank says that by nearly doubling its share of global GDP to 52 per cent by 2050, Asia could regain the dominant economic position it held 300 years ago. Yet, as several academics have pointed out “it is beset by interstate rivalries that resemble 19th century Europe,” as well the new challenges of the 21st century: environmental catastrophes, natural disasters, climate change, terrorism, cyber security and maritime issues. An increasingly assertive China that has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy of hiding its light and keeping its head low, adds to the uncertainty of the prevailing strategic environment.

India’s military and economic prowess are greater than ever before, yet its ability to influence South Asian countries is less than what it was, say, 30 years ago. An unstable Nepal with widespread anti-India sentiment, a triumphalist Sri Lanka where Sinhalese chauvinism shows no signs of accommodating legitimate Tamil aspirations, a chaotic Pakistan unwilling to even reassure New Delhi on future terrorist strikes, are symptomatic of a region being pulled in different directions.

Can our thinking from the past help us navigate through this troubled present? Pankaj Mishra, in his brilliant book, From the Ruins of Empire: the Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia, describes how three 19th century thinkers, the Persian Jamal-al Din al-Afghani, Liang Qichao from China and India’s Rabindranath Tagore, navigated through Eastern tradition and the Western onslaught to think of creative ways to strike a balance and find harmony. In many ways, these ideas remain relevant today as well. For if Asia merely mimics the West in its quest for economic growth and conspicuous consumption, and the attendant conflict over economic resources and military prowess, the “revenge of the East” in the Asian century and “all its victories” will remain “truly Pyrrhic.”

(This is an edited version of Prof. Mattoo's presidential address to the Annual Convention of the Indian Association of International Studies in New Delhi on December 10, 2012.)

(Source: The Hindu)

Prof. Mattoo's take on the Asian Century

Prof. Mattoo in this conversation with ABC Radio National talks about India-Australia Relations in the  Asian Century, the upcoming conference- The Argumentative Indian to be recently hosted in Melbourne and India's larger role in global geo-politics.. To listen to the interview, click on the link below...

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/sundayextra/newsmaker/4337466

The Romance of the Nation-State

Prof. Mattoo in conversation with Prof. Ashis Nandy and Prof. Phillip Darby at the State Library of Victoria, Melbourne in a session which tried to deconstruct the notion of the nation-state and simultaneously make an attempt to explore new imaginations of social existence as well as political entities. The conversation was a part of the conference Playing Ball? The Ins and Outs of the Indo-Australian Relationship hosted by the Institute of Postcolonial Studies (IPCS) and the Australia India Institute (AII)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament : Global and Regional Challenges

Prof. Mattoo joined the Former Foreign Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans in a conversation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the University of Melbourne. To watch the video click below:

The event is also featured on ABC's Big Ideas TV, and to just listen to the audio or to download the video, you can also go to the following link:

http://www.abc.net.au/tv/bigideas/stories/2012/08/27/3576536.htm

Hoping for an Indian summer

OVER recent weeks a ''reality'' television series has led a mixed group of Indian citizens on an at times hair-raising guided tour of Australia, a nation that the program's title suggests is ''Dumb, Drunk & Racist''. Having got our attention with this outrageous provocation, it becomes clear that the bleak label is host Joe Hildebrand's own creation - his Indian fellow travellers are clearly in at least two minds about the proposition. Clever, funny and at times brave and insightful, the show entertains. It also confronts a serious issue: are Indians and Australians ready for that larger journey towards understanding each other better?

Recent signals have been mixed. Assaults and robberies that affected Indian students in 2009-10 saw them leave Australia in droves. The exodus wrought havoc in the tertiary education sector and cost Australia billions of dollars. Aussies visiting India used to be set upon by happy crowds chanting names such as ''Boon'', ''Border'' and ''Mark Taylor''. Cricket is still a shared passion, but since the student crisis travellers from Down Under have been asked, "Why do Australians hate us?"

The good news is that recent polling suggests an unexpectedly rapid recovery in Australia's reputation in India. The AMR Research data, revealed in a report published today by the Australia India Institute, shows that Indians surveyed ranked Australia the eighth-best country in the world, up from 35th during the depths of the student crisis.

Yet similar optimistic moments in the past have turned out to be false dawns and there has been precious little solidarity between our democracies. Australia hasn't hosted a visiting Indian prime minister for 26 years.

The AII report, Beyond the Lost Decade, reveals some of the reasons why. Influential Indian policymakers regard Australia's foreign policy as ''erratic'', ''impetuous'', ''immature'' and ''unduly mercantilist''. Australian diplomats counter that India is simply holding on to old grudges, mainly the perceived overreaction to its 1998 nuclear tests.

The report, produced by a taskforce whose members combine decades of experience in diplomacy, government and media, finds that perceived commonalities such as cricket, democracy and the English language have created a deceptive sense of familiarity that masks very different world views. India's need for energy security will not necessarily produce close political ties. India demands respect and prefers discrete alliances with reliable partners. It seems to move slowly, yet once its confidence is gained - as an unlikely friend in Israel has gained it - doors can open quickly.

The Labor Party's decision last December to lift its ban on uranium sales to India created a circuit-breaker and an opportunity to advance the relationship. But since then the Gillard cabinet has not formally adopted the policy, apparently due to problems with international treaty obligations. This is creating renewed uncertainty among some Indian officials.

Nimble diplomacy from the 1960s to the 1990s helped Australia get in on the ground floor of Asia's economic miracle. But when India opened its economy in 1991, Australia failed to seize the opportunity. It will now be harder for business to establish a foothold, especially without an Australian Indian community as large and influential as those in Britain and the United States, which facilitated closer ties.

The taskforce report highlights practical actions that both nations can take to build goodwill, stronger people-to-people ties and better understanding of each other.

Changes to visa regulations after the student crisis moved the goalposts for some Indians studying in Australia. Although some grandfathering measures were put in place, many of those affected have only until the end of this year to make other arrangements, or leave. The report suggests giving them another year to work out their futures.Similarly, the withdrawal of post-study work rights for international students undertaking vocational courses hit Indian students hardest. The report suggests restoring those rights to students at TAFE and other reputable vocational institutes, where most Indians were enrolled.

Australia's federal system makes achieving uniform standards in any field a challenge, but competition between states can be healthy. States that enjoy the benefits of the international student program should be rated annually on student security and education quality. A high ranking would produce overseas marketing opportunities for states that excel.

Making Australia Asia-literate won't just happen of its own accord. Innovative programs to educate Australian schoolchildren in the history, culture, economies and languages of our dynamic regional neighbours are essential. To avoid the possibility of some states and schools failing to implement these changes, the Australian curriculum should mandate and specify the study of India from primary school onwards.

In higher education, for every 100 international students who study here, one Australian student should be supported to study in Asia. On today's enrolment figures, that would mean up to 3500 young Australians completing all or part of their degrees in Asian countries, including India.

Australia's reputation abroad is high, but this popularity is superficial and, as the student crisis showed, can plummet when negative narratives get picked up by 24-hour television news channels abroad.

The taskforce report calls for major changes at Radio Australia and the international television service Australia Network. India doesn't need news broadcasts funded by Australian taxpayers - it has 500 television stations of its own, dozens of which carry 24-hour news. Nor do Australian expatriates and travellers need Canberra to pay for their news and sports updates, all of which they can get from the internet. By junking the old broadcasting model, Radio Australia and Australia Network resources could be freed up to commission or produce quality programs that Asians want to hear, read and view. Doing so would convey a far better sense of what Australia is, and can do, than any number of news bulletins. Such content would have greater impact if distributed via India and Asia's own TV and radio networks.

In 2009, when Indian media reported the student crisis as symptomatic of racism, Australian officials reacted defensively, provoking claims of a cover-up. Dumb, Drunk & Racist suggests a braver approach. A smart, sober and diverse Australia should be big enough to admit everything is not perfect, engaged enough to effectively communicate what it offers the world, and confident enough to allow others to judge.

(Co-authored with Christopher Kremmer)

(Source: The Age)

Kashmir is a tinderbox

 Greater Kashmir Magazine talk to Prof. Mattoo at length about the present situation in Kashmir and the possibilities of change. The excerpts:

 As a long-time observer of Kashmir, how do you view the situation in Kashmir right now, post 2010 unrest?
Kashmir most certainly appears calm on the surface. There are a large number of tourists in the valley, educational institutions are running without disruptions, and regular day-to-day life seems to be proceeding normally for most ordinary Kashmiris.  There is a renewed focus on basic issues of governance; your paper, for instance, brought out the scandalous state of health services in the state.
But anyone who has lived in the Kashmir or observed it closely for some time will recognise that it is a tinderbox, and could be in flames at the slightest provocation and the surface calm would vaporise in an instant.  And for real and durable peace you have to address the deeper issues, the conflicts, and ensure that there is not just resolution, but real justice.  After all, families of those who were killed will not forget their anger & hurt in a hurry or forgive the perpetrators until they see that justice is done. And, of course, all this has to be contextualised within the larger political dimensions of the problem

You have been a part of Track II diplomacy on Kashmir in the past. New Delhi had last year initiated the process of interlocution on Kashmir. Recently the interlocutors came up with their report, which evoked mixed reaction from separatists and mainstream parties in JK. What are your reflections on it?
I will be totally candid.  I   think it was a farcical exercise. The interlocutors have not managed to reach out to important dissident segments in Kashmir, the Report has not produced any sort of consensus in J&K or in New Delhi, and its impact is not likely to be felt in ‘grand’ political terms. This report, at best, is an academic exercise of little policy consequence. The fact is that there already exist valuable documents and reports, which have, in greater detail, explained the possible trajectories for building peace in the state. It was not yet another document that we needed to resolve the multiple conflicts in the state, but a genuine political process of reconciliation between the people of the state and New Delhi. Many dissidents from the state opposed this panel of interlocutors because they believed that the group did not have the mandate to negotiate peace, and that this was merely a diversionary tactic to buy time. One and half years later, they stand vindicated.

Do you think we should have had politicians as interlocutors?
Ever since September 25, 2010, when the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finalised the eight point political initiative on Jammu and Kashmir, at the height of the crises in the valley, when over 100 persons had been killed, expectations were raised that a seasoned politician would lead the panel of interlocutors. This perception was built on the successful all-party delegation that had visited the state.  The announcement of a three-member non-political team provoked widespread anger and hostility and even invited ridicule. Although the three members were undoubtedly professionals, who had excelled in their respective fields, the impression was created that the panel had been finalised without due diligence or a serious application of mind by those who are quite oblivious to the complexities of the problems in the state and were insensitive to the sentiment of the people living there.
In J&K, symbolism is almost as important as substance. Consider the history of the last half a century. Almost every political crisis and political agreement has been possible through initiatives led by heavyweights and backed by the political leadership of the country.
It was Lal Bahadur Shastri who was deputed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963 to help defuse the crisis following the theft of the Prophet's relic. While the chief of Intelligence Bureau B N Mullik also played a vital role and enjoyed Nehru's confidence, it was Shastri who was the public face of the initiative.
The 1974 Kashmir accord was possible because of the confidence that G Parthasarthi enjoyed of then Prime Minster Indira Gandhi. Similarly, in the 1990s, interlocutors like Rajesh Pilot and George Fernandes were able to make a difference because they created a perception that they were leading a serious political initiative backed by the highest political authority in the land. Indeed even the mandate of the panel of interlocutors had been defined in the most non-anodyne terms: "The three interlocutors appointed by the Govt. have been entrusted with the responsibility of undertaking a sustained dialogue with the people of Jammu & Kashmir to understand their problems and chart a course for the future.”

The separatist leaders categorically refused to talk to interlocutors till the situation improved in Kashmir. Geelani put forth five-point formula for peace to return in Kashmir while Mirwaiz Umar Farooq gave his four-point proposal? Should New Delhi accede to the proposals at any point in time?
New Delhi should take all proposals into consideration and speed up the dialogue process with all shades of opinion at the earliest. The separatists should also demonstrate some flexibility and shun their refusal to talk unless all their demands have been met. If there is a genuine desire by all stakeholders to move towards a political solution, there must be some room for compromise.

What in your opinion would help bring the separatist on board?Some flexibility by Delhi to at least put some of their demands on the table for discussion. Assurance that dialogue would be unconditional, uninterrupted and uninterruptible even if local and regional conditions were to change.  The trust deficit that exists must be reduced by letting political leaders engage the separatists rather than officers from the intelligence agencies, who have traditionally played this role. The people of Kashmir have suffered and been traumatized over the last decades and lived in uncertainty for the last six decades. Clarity of thinking is not easy in these times, but it is critical to move forward. The reality is that the people must look for pragmatic ways to ensure the honour, dignity and the empowerment of the people in this globalised world. And they must give dialogue and peace a chance. There is an India beyond bunkers, security forces and corrupt and corrupted politicians. It is the vibrant India of entrepreneurs, professionals, activists, civil society activists and the robust and free media, among others. More and more Kashmiris must discover this India and build a coalition with it. That is the best guarantee against the other India which we witness in the Valley.

At least 117 people were killed in 2010 unrest in action by police and paramilitary forces? Justice still eludes the victims of the families? Why so?Unfortunately, the judicial process in the entire subcontinent is a lengthy and cumbersome affair. But given the hurt and anger that these killings have caused, and given that most were innocent young persons, we need to have a fast track mechanism to deliver justice.
I hope progress will be made soon so that the families of the victims can feel some relief; otherwise the faith of the average Kashmiri in New Delhi will be further eroded. Remember the one ordinary Kashmiri who confronted the Union home minister with a simple question at the height of the 2010 crises: “If we are citizens of India, why are you spraying bullets on us?” And another who asked: “If you say Kashmir is atoot ang of India, then why are you putting your own ang into the frying pan?

At one point in time, in 2010 unrest, New Delhi pointed to “governance deficit” in Jammu and Kashmir? Do you feel a lot more needs be done vis-à-vis good governance?
 Yes, most definitely. There are complaints not only from all rural but also from most urban areas about a huge governance deficit. The visible absence of major development initiatives everywhere is a big disappointment. Moreover, the lack of empowerment of Panches and Sarpanches is a major cause for concern. Devolution of powers to the grassroots level most certainly could help improve the situation in rural areas. Similarly, elections to municipal bodies are long overdue and should be held at the earliest so that urban grievances can be resolved locally. This is not criticising any one government, but the entire system which is still patterned as a colonial instrument of “ruling” rather than “serving”.

What are your views on the recurring debate on the revocation of the AFSPA? The Army doesn’t agree to the proposition while the state is hardly able to do anything?
If the state continues to be peaceful in most areas, obviously there should be a revision of security measures established to only control conflict. In the meantime, all forces must be vigilant so that any past mistakes are not repeated in the future. The footprint of security forces in civilian areas must continue to be reduced. To that end, the removal of bunkers from several areas in Srinagar is a good beginning.

Are, at this point in time, any back channels on vis-à-vis New Delhi and separatists?
Having been in Australia for the past year, I have not been privy to these discussions, if there are any.

 As an academic, what are your views on the educational system in JK?
The youth of the State can become its greatest strength, its soft power. Investing in the right kind of education, training and skill development have therefore to be part of the fundamentals of the government if it has to take advantage of the huge demographic dividend. It is vital that the gross enrolment ratio in higher education rises to at least 15 per cent in the next 10 years. This calls for a massive expansion in education: more universities, more off-site campuses, more colleges, more Industrial Training Institutes and more polytechnics that extensively use the revolutionary new instruments of Information and Communication Technology to deliver world-class course-ware.
Public-private partnerships are also needed to enhance international connectivity by extending broadband access in the state — with stronger incentives provided through the existing universal access funds for telecommunications. Given the geography of the state, and its growing endowments of skills, electronic exports of services may play a more significant role in its beneficial economic integration than the export of apples and handicrafts. 
 The State government must consider building a knowledge city where there is a seamless transition from studying to training to working within the same geographical space. The Dubai Knowledge village is one, but it is not the only example. The raison d’être was a long-term economic strategy to develop the region’s talent pool and accelerate its transition into a knowledge-based economy. The benefits for partners include 100 per cent foreign ownership, 100 per cent exemption from taxes, 100 per cent repatriation of assets and profits, and effortless visa issuance. Imagine a knowledge city in a valley on the foothills of the Himalayas where potentially the best and the brightest young men and women from all over the region can come and study, live and work together in a setting that offers world-class infrastructure.

Farce in three parts

On May 24, 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) made public the report submitted to it by the interlocutors on Jammu and Kashmir appointed in the midst of the 2010 uprising in the Kashmir valley. The group of three interlocutors has produced a report that is rich in detail, based on extensive fieldwork, elegantly written, and apparently well meaning. However, we remain deeply sceptical that the public dissemination of such a report — or a public debate on the findings/recommendations — will help to build sustainable peace in Jammu and Kashmir. Not surprisingly, there are virtually no takers for the report among the stakeholders in the State and even the MHA has distanced itself from the work that it commissioned from the interlocutors, by adding the following caveat: “The view expressed in the Report are the views of the interlocutors. The Government has not yet taken any decisions on the Report.” In fact, we believe that the release of the report — instead of doing any good — will prove to be counter-productive and could further strengthen the sentiment in the State that the government of India is not serious about a resolution of the problems of Jammu and Kashmir. We have reason to believe that the recent ineptitude in dealing with the State stems from the decision that the Prime Minister would discontinue to have direct oversight over the affairs of the State. Contrast the “Naya” Jammu and Kashmir vision articulated by the Prime Minister in 2005 with the obtuse legalese articulated, ad nauseum, by the Home Ministry.

We have fundamental problems with almost all aspects of what has turned out to be a farcical exercise: beginning with the appointment of non-political interlocutors; and the structure and content of the report they have produced.

Ever since September 25, 2010, when the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finalised the eight point political initiative on Jammu and Kashmir, at the height of the crises in Kashmir when over 100 people had been killed, expectations were raised that a seasoned politician would lead the panel of interlocutors. This perception was built on the successful all-party delegation that had visited the State. The announcement of a three-member non-political team provoked widespread anger and hostility and even invited ridicule. Although the three members were undoubtedly professionals, who had excelled in their respective fields, the impression was created that the panel had been finalised without due diligence or a serious application of mind by those who are quite oblivious to the complexities of the problems in the State and were insensitive to the sentiment of the people living there.

On symbolism and substance

In J&K, symbolism is almost as important as substance. Consider the history of the last half a century. Almost every political crisis and political agreement has been possible through initiatives led by heavyweights and backed by the political leadership of the country.

It was Lal Bahadur Shastri who was deputed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963 to help defuse the crisis following the theft of the Prophet's relic. While the chief of the Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Mullik, also played a vital role and enjoyed Nehru's confidence, it was Shastri who was the public face of the initiative.

The three parts

The 1974 Kashmir accord was possible because of the confidence that G. Parthasarthi enjoyed of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Similarly, in the 1990s, interlocutors like Rajesh Pilot and George Fernandes were able to make a difference because they created a perception that they were leading a serious political initiative backed by the highest political authority in the land. Indeed even the mandate of the panel of interlocutors had been defined in the most non-anodyne terms: “The three interlocutors appointed by the Govt. have been entrusted with the responsibility of undertaking a sustained dialogue with the people of Jammu & Kashmir to understand their problems and chart a course for the future.”

The Report, itself, as one of the interlocutors has suggested, needs to be read in three parts: a situation report, a set of political ideas for discussion, and a road map recommending confidence-building measures (CBM) and dialogue. Most informed observers of Jammu and Kashmir would gain little by reading the “situation report.”

The CBMs are well known and, in fact, do little to advance the work produced by the Prime Minister's Working Groups. Set up during the second round table conference of the Prime Minister in May 2006, the five working groups had a specific agenda: (i) confidence-building measures (CBMs) across segments of society in the State; (ii) strengthening relations across the Line of Control in Kashmir; (iii) economic development; (iv) ensuring good governance; and (v) Centre-State relations. Apart from the working group on Centre-State relations, all others submitted their reports in April 2007. The government had, in principle, accepted the recommendations and virtually committed itself to their implementation.

For instance, Hamid Ansari chaired the group on CBMs in the State, and it included representatives from all mainstream political parties and groups. The group's agenda included the following: measures to improve the condition of the people affected by militancy, schemes to rehabilitate all widows and orphans affected by militancy, issues relating to the relaxation of conditions which have foresworn militancy, an effective rehabilitation policy, including employment, for Kashmiri Pandit migrants, an approach considering issues relating to return of Kashmiri youth from areas controlled by Pakistan, and measures to protect and preserve the unique cultural and religious heritage of the State.

The group had recommended, among other things, a review and revocation of laws that impinge on the fundamental rights of common citizens, such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), review of cases of persons in jails and general amnesty for those under trial for minor offences, devising effective rehabilitation policies for Kashmiri Pandits and a comprehensive package to enable them to return to their original residences and for the Kashmiri youth in Pakistan-controlled areas, who may have joined militancy for monetary considerations or misguided ideological reasons, measures to strengthen the State human rights commission, and setting up of a State commission for minorities. The interlocutors' report, in no way, improves on these recommendations.

The only real value addition could have been on proposing new political ideas. And here, not only are there no novel ideas, even the proposals (borrowed mostly from other reports) are embedded in the “grand” idea of the establishment of a Constitutional Committee, to review all acts and articles of the Constitution of India extended to the State after the Delhi Agreement of 1952. In other words, the Report — on the most critical issue — passes the buck and recommends that New Delhi look for someone who is regarded in high esteem in the State and the rest of the country to do the job.

On other related issues too, the Report falls well short of expectations. The report does not give importance to delivering justice to those people wronged over the last two decades. The report also fights shy of identifying some of the other primary causes of the problems in the Jammu and Kashmir conflict: including the widespread rigging of elections, and the political high-handedness of New Delhi in J&K.

Truth and reconciliation

The report talks about the need to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). However, the report treats the whole concept of a TRC in a very casual manner. It says, for example, “even if justice cannot be provided for all victims of violence, if some of those guilty of human rights abuses, including militants, were to ask forgiveness from the families of their victims, it would provide closure for many.”

The report also suffers from a serious lack of focus. The report's recommendations address issues that trivialise the real problems of the State. For instance, by recommending inter-regional dance and theatre competitions, cultural talks about inter-regional culture, and establishing “an art gallery in Srinagar,” the interlocutors undermine the gravitas that a report of this kind should have, if it is to be taken seriously.

Finally, how does one evaluate a report of this kind? It has not managed to reach out to important segments in Kashmir, it has not produced any sort of consensus in J&K or in New Delhi, and its impact is not likely to be felt in “grand” political terms. This report, at best, is an academic exercise of little policy consequence. The fact is there exist valuable documents and reports, which have, in great detail, explained the possible trajectories for building peace in the State. It was not yet another document that we needed to resolve the multiple conflicts in the State, but a genuine political process of reconciliation between the people of the State and New Delhi. Many dissidents from the State opposed this panel of interlocutors because they believed that the group did not have a mandate to negotiate peace, and that this was merely a diversionary tactic to buy time. One-and-half-years later, they stand vindicated.

(Co-authored with Dr.Happymon Jacob)

Source: The Hindu, 04/06/12

Myths about Afghanistan

It is now becoming increasingly clear that President Barack Obama’s administration is almost desperate to forge a deal with the Taliban, against all odds. The opening of a Taliban office in Qatar and the release of high value Taliban assets from the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, it seems, are the next steps in a process of so-called ‘reconciliation’ with the Quetta Shura led by Taliban’s Amirul Momineen, Mullah Mohammad Omar. This latest initiative seems to have, at the moment, neither the full support of Afghan President Hamid Karzai nor indeed the Islamabad-Rawalpindi establishment, but this can change quickly if past experience is good evidence.

While it may be prudent for New Delhi to wait and watch, it is critical simultaneously to begin to debunk the myths on the basis of which this so-called peace process is being fostered by Washington and some of its European allies, reckless in their eagerness to get out of Afghanistan. While there are those even within the Indian establishment who are arguing for ‘keeping all options open’, there can and must be no compromise with Talibanism.

Indeed, these ‘western’ myths are built on convenient cultural stereotypes divorced from the reality of Afghanistan’s past and often disconnected from contemporary Afghan politics and society. These cultural explanations are constructed as a useful justification for policies seeking an early exit from Afghanistan.

Myth one: The majority of the Pashtuns support the Taliban; ergo let the Taliban rule Afghanistan. While it is clear that all Taliban are Pashtuns, not all Pashtuns are Taliban. The suggestion that even the majority of the Pashtuns support the Taliban is debatable. Within the complex tribal structure of the Pashtuns, the bulk of the Taliban leadership is Ghilzai which, of course, has historically been at contradictions with the equally powerful Durranis. But even within the Ghilzais, the extent of support for the Taliban has always been contested. Opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan are notoriously unreliable, but for every survey that suggests majority support for the Taliban there is another which would point to tremendous resentment against them. What is clear is that a large section of the people would support those forces that are on the ascendant or likely to control the power structure. This, of course, is not unique to Afghanistan and similar to any society that has witnessed conflict and violence over long periods of history. It is also clear that outside the Pashtuns, the Taliban have virtually no support among the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras or the smaller minorities.

Myth two: Talibanism is part of the traditional social structure of the Pashtuns; ergo let the Afghans decide what is good for them. Nothing could be further from the truth. The savage regime that the Taliban sought to impose on the people of Afghanistan is not native to the people of the country. While the Afghans are devout Muslims, it is the pre-Islamic moral and social code of Pashtunwali that still guides most of the Pashtun tribes. The ethical code of the Pashtunwali, with its emphasis on hospitality, integrity, justice, sanctuary does not resemble the radical code that the Taliban enforced during their short stint as rulers of Afghanistan. In other words, to reject Talibanism is not to reject Pashtunwali or even orthodox Islam. Talibanism was a product of the fanatical zeal of intelligence agencies seeking to produce indoctrinated robots who would follow even the most irrational order, and not rooted in the culturally rich and vibrant history of Afghanistan. To suggest that Talibanism is synonymous with Afghan culture is to show extreme ignorance of the country’s history and to display deep contempt for the people of the country.

Myth three: Violence and war are part of the Afghan way of life; ergo let the Afghans keep fighting amongst themselves. No country, no culture privileges war and violence; neither does nor has Afghanistan. The Afghans have fought invaders and occasionally been invaders themselves. But Afghanistan has an equally strong tradition of peace and non-violence. From the 13th century poet, mystic and theologian Jalaladin Muhammad Rumi to the 20th century statesman Badshah Khan, the Frontier Gandhi, the Afghans have had a tradition of thinking and articulating some of the finest ideas on pacifism and non-violence. To capsule all Afghans as violent men and women who love killing or being killed is to caricature the complex cultural diversity of the country.

Myth four: You can win a battle against the Afghan, but never a war; ergo, let us get out as soon as possible. The Afghans have indeed a fierce sense of nationalism and have fought and won their independence over centuries. But history is more complex than most contemporary commentaries of Afghan wars, including the defeat of the British in the 19th century or the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1990, would suggest. For those who want to take a more cynical view of Afghan valour it is useful to read, for instance, an account of General Hari Singh Nalwa’s campaigns against the Pashtun tribes during Maharajah Ranjit Singh’s time. In any case, these cultural explanations of history are deeply suspect. Modern armies win campaigns based on superior technology, better training, a fuller understanding of the terrain, a more refined strategy and the willingness to put soldiers on the ground. If the Americans lose the war in Afghanistan it will not be because the Afghan DNA is so resilient that it can defeat ‘any superpower’ but because the United States and its allies have neither the patience to fight a long war nor the willingness to take the suffering needed to wage and win wars.

Let us be clear, the return of the Taliban, with or without al-Qaeda and with or without an aggressive foreign policy would be the single most dangerous trend in the region. It would privilege the forces of obscurantism, create the conditions for permanent instability in Afghanistan and potentially become a source of spreading the violence of intolerance across the region. There can and must not be any reconciliation with those who represent, in every sense, the diabolic forces of evil.

(Source: The New Indian Express)