Kashmir is a tinderbox

 Greater Kashmir Magazine talk to Prof. Mattoo at length about the present situation in Kashmir and the possibilities of change. The excerpts:

 As a long-time observer of Kashmir, how do you view the situation in Kashmir right now, post 2010 unrest?
Kashmir most certainly appears calm on the surface. There are a large number of tourists in the valley, educational institutions are running without disruptions, and regular day-to-day life seems to be proceeding normally for most ordinary Kashmiris.  There is a renewed focus on basic issues of governance; your paper, for instance, brought out the scandalous state of health services in the state.
But anyone who has lived in the Kashmir or observed it closely for some time will recognise that it is a tinderbox, and could be in flames at the slightest provocation and the surface calm would vaporise in an instant.  And for real and durable peace you have to address the deeper issues, the conflicts, and ensure that there is not just resolution, but real justice.  After all, families of those who were killed will not forget their anger & hurt in a hurry or forgive the perpetrators until they see that justice is done. And, of course, all this has to be contextualised within the larger political dimensions of the problem

You have been a part of Track II diplomacy on Kashmir in the past. New Delhi had last year initiated the process of interlocution on Kashmir. Recently the interlocutors came up with their report, which evoked mixed reaction from separatists and mainstream parties in JK. What are your reflections on it?
I will be totally candid.  I   think it was a farcical exercise. The interlocutors have not managed to reach out to important dissident segments in Kashmir, the Report has not produced any sort of consensus in J&K or in New Delhi, and its impact is not likely to be felt in ‘grand’ political terms. This report, at best, is an academic exercise of little policy consequence. The fact is that there already exist valuable documents and reports, which have, in greater detail, explained the possible trajectories for building peace in the state. It was not yet another document that we needed to resolve the multiple conflicts in the state, but a genuine political process of reconciliation between the people of the state and New Delhi. Many dissidents from the state opposed this panel of interlocutors because they believed that the group did not have the mandate to negotiate peace, and that this was merely a diversionary tactic to buy time. One and half years later, they stand vindicated.

Do you think we should have had politicians as interlocutors?
Ever since September 25, 2010, when the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finalised the eight point political initiative on Jammu and Kashmir, at the height of the crises in the valley, when over 100 persons had been killed, expectations were raised that a seasoned politician would lead the panel of interlocutors. This perception was built on the successful all-party delegation that had visited the state.  The announcement of a three-member non-political team provoked widespread anger and hostility and even invited ridicule. Although the three members were undoubtedly professionals, who had excelled in their respective fields, the impression was created that the panel had been finalised without due diligence or a serious application of mind by those who are quite oblivious to the complexities of the problems in the state and were insensitive to the sentiment of the people living there.
In J&K, symbolism is almost as important as substance. Consider the history of the last half a century. Almost every political crisis and political agreement has been possible through initiatives led by heavyweights and backed by the political leadership of the country.
It was Lal Bahadur Shastri who was deputed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963 to help defuse the crisis following the theft of the Prophet's relic. While the chief of Intelligence Bureau B N Mullik also played a vital role and enjoyed Nehru's confidence, it was Shastri who was the public face of the initiative.
The 1974 Kashmir accord was possible because of the confidence that G Parthasarthi enjoyed of then Prime Minster Indira Gandhi. Similarly, in the 1990s, interlocutors like Rajesh Pilot and George Fernandes were able to make a difference because they created a perception that they were leading a serious political initiative backed by the highest political authority in the land. Indeed even the mandate of the panel of interlocutors had been defined in the most non-anodyne terms: "The three interlocutors appointed by the Govt. have been entrusted with the responsibility of undertaking a sustained dialogue with the people of Jammu & Kashmir to understand their problems and chart a course for the future.”

The separatist leaders categorically refused to talk to interlocutors till the situation improved in Kashmir. Geelani put forth five-point formula for peace to return in Kashmir while Mirwaiz Umar Farooq gave his four-point proposal? Should New Delhi accede to the proposals at any point in time?
New Delhi should take all proposals into consideration and speed up the dialogue process with all shades of opinion at the earliest. The separatists should also demonstrate some flexibility and shun their refusal to talk unless all their demands have been met. If there is a genuine desire by all stakeholders to move towards a political solution, there must be some room for compromise.

What in your opinion would help bring the separatist on board?Some flexibility by Delhi to at least put some of their demands on the table for discussion. Assurance that dialogue would be unconditional, uninterrupted and uninterruptible even if local and regional conditions were to change.  The trust deficit that exists must be reduced by letting political leaders engage the separatists rather than officers from the intelligence agencies, who have traditionally played this role. The people of Kashmir have suffered and been traumatized over the last decades and lived in uncertainty for the last six decades. Clarity of thinking is not easy in these times, but it is critical to move forward. The reality is that the people must look for pragmatic ways to ensure the honour, dignity and the empowerment of the people in this globalised world. And they must give dialogue and peace a chance. There is an India beyond bunkers, security forces and corrupt and corrupted politicians. It is the vibrant India of entrepreneurs, professionals, activists, civil society activists and the robust and free media, among others. More and more Kashmiris must discover this India and build a coalition with it. That is the best guarantee against the other India which we witness in the Valley.

At least 117 people were killed in 2010 unrest in action by police and paramilitary forces? Justice still eludes the victims of the families? Why so?Unfortunately, the judicial process in the entire subcontinent is a lengthy and cumbersome affair. But given the hurt and anger that these killings have caused, and given that most were innocent young persons, we need to have a fast track mechanism to deliver justice.
I hope progress will be made soon so that the families of the victims can feel some relief; otherwise the faith of the average Kashmiri in New Delhi will be further eroded. Remember the one ordinary Kashmiri who confronted the Union home minister with a simple question at the height of the 2010 crises: “If we are citizens of India, why are you spraying bullets on us?” And another who asked: “If you say Kashmir is atoot ang of India, then why are you putting your own ang into the frying pan?

At one point in time, in 2010 unrest, New Delhi pointed to “governance deficit” in Jammu and Kashmir? Do you feel a lot more needs be done vis-à-vis good governance?
 Yes, most definitely. There are complaints not only from all rural but also from most urban areas about a huge governance deficit. The visible absence of major development initiatives everywhere is a big disappointment. Moreover, the lack of empowerment of Panches and Sarpanches is a major cause for concern. Devolution of powers to the grassroots level most certainly could help improve the situation in rural areas. Similarly, elections to municipal bodies are long overdue and should be held at the earliest so that urban grievances can be resolved locally. This is not criticising any one government, but the entire system which is still patterned as a colonial instrument of “ruling” rather than “serving”.

What are your views on the recurring debate on the revocation of the AFSPA? The Army doesn’t agree to the proposition while the state is hardly able to do anything?
If the state continues to be peaceful in most areas, obviously there should be a revision of security measures established to only control conflict. In the meantime, all forces must be vigilant so that any past mistakes are not repeated in the future. The footprint of security forces in civilian areas must continue to be reduced. To that end, the removal of bunkers from several areas in Srinagar is a good beginning.

Are, at this point in time, any back channels on vis-à-vis New Delhi and separatists?
Having been in Australia for the past year, I have not been privy to these discussions, if there are any.

 As an academic, what are your views on the educational system in JK?
The youth of the State can become its greatest strength, its soft power. Investing in the right kind of education, training and skill development have therefore to be part of the fundamentals of the government if it has to take advantage of the huge demographic dividend. It is vital that the gross enrolment ratio in higher education rises to at least 15 per cent in the next 10 years. This calls for a massive expansion in education: more universities, more off-site campuses, more colleges, more Industrial Training Institutes and more polytechnics that extensively use the revolutionary new instruments of Information and Communication Technology to deliver world-class course-ware.
Public-private partnerships are also needed to enhance international connectivity by extending broadband access in the state — with stronger incentives provided through the existing universal access funds for telecommunications. Given the geography of the state, and its growing endowments of skills, electronic exports of services may play a more significant role in its beneficial economic integration than the export of apples and handicrafts. 
 The State government must consider building a knowledge city where there is a seamless transition from studying to training to working within the same geographical space. The Dubai Knowledge village is one, but it is not the only example. The raison d’être was a long-term economic strategy to develop the region’s talent pool and accelerate its transition into a knowledge-based economy. The benefits for partners include 100 per cent foreign ownership, 100 per cent exemption from taxes, 100 per cent repatriation of assets and profits, and effortless visa issuance. Imagine a knowledge city in a valley on the foothills of the Himalayas where potentially the best and the brightest young men and women from all over the region can come and study, live and work together in a setting that offers world-class infrastructure.

Farce in three parts

On May 24, 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) made public the report submitted to it by the interlocutors on Jammu and Kashmir appointed in the midst of the 2010 uprising in the Kashmir valley. The group of three interlocutors has produced a report that is rich in detail, based on extensive fieldwork, elegantly written, and apparently well meaning. However, we remain deeply sceptical that the public dissemination of such a report — or a public debate on the findings/recommendations — will help to build sustainable peace in Jammu and Kashmir. Not surprisingly, there are virtually no takers for the report among the stakeholders in the State and even the MHA has distanced itself from the work that it commissioned from the interlocutors, by adding the following caveat: “The view expressed in the Report are the views of the interlocutors. The Government has not yet taken any decisions on the Report.” In fact, we believe that the release of the report — instead of doing any good — will prove to be counter-productive and could further strengthen the sentiment in the State that the government of India is not serious about a resolution of the problems of Jammu and Kashmir. We have reason to believe that the recent ineptitude in dealing with the State stems from the decision that the Prime Minister would discontinue to have direct oversight over the affairs of the State. Contrast the “Naya” Jammu and Kashmir vision articulated by the Prime Minister in 2005 with the obtuse legalese articulated, ad nauseum, by the Home Ministry.

We have fundamental problems with almost all aspects of what has turned out to be a farcical exercise: beginning with the appointment of non-political interlocutors; and the structure and content of the report they have produced.

Ever since September 25, 2010, when the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) finalised the eight point political initiative on Jammu and Kashmir, at the height of the crises in Kashmir when over 100 people had been killed, expectations were raised that a seasoned politician would lead the panel of interlocutors. This perception was built on the successful all-party delegation that had visited the State. The announcement of a three-member non-political team provoked widespread anger and hostility and even invited ridicule. Although the three members were undoubtedly professionals, who had excelled in their respective fields, the impression was created that the panel had been finalised without due diligence or a serious application of mind by those who are quite oblivious to the complexities of the problems in the State and were insensitive to the sentiment of the people living there.

On symbolism and substance

In J&K, symbolism is almost as important as substance. Consider the history of the last half a century. Almost every political crisis and political agreement has been possible through initiatives led by heavyweights and backed by the political leadership of the country.

It was Lal Bahadur Shastri who was deputed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963 to help defuse the crisis following the theft of the Prophet's relic. While the chief of the Intelligence Bureau, B.N. Mullik, also played a vital role and enjoyed Nehru's confidence, it was Shastri who was the public face of the initiative.

The three parts

The 1974 Kashmir accord was possible because of the confidence that G. Parthasarthi enjoyed of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Similarly, in the 1990s, interlocutors like Rajesh Pilot and George Fernandes were able to make a difference because they created a perception that they were leading a serious political initiative backed by the highest political authority in the land. Indeed even the mandate of the panel of interlocutors had been defined in the most non-anodyne terms: “The three interlocutors appointed by the Govt. have been entrusted with the responsibility of undertaking a sustained dialogue with the people of Jammu & Kashmir to understand their problems and chart a course for the future.”

The Report, itself, as one of the interlocutors has suggested, needs to be read in three parts: a situation report, a set of political ideas for discussion, and a road map recommending confidence-building measures (CBM) and dialogue. Most informed observers of Jammu and Kashmir would gain little by reading the “situation report.”

The CBMs are well known and, in fact, do little to advance the work produced by the Prime Minister's Working Groups. Set up during the second round table conference of the Prime Minister in May 2006, the five working groups had a specific agenda: (i) confidence-building measures (CBMs) across segments of society in the State; (ii) strengthening relations across the Line of Control in Kashmir; (iii) economic development; (iv) ensuring good governance; and (v) Centre-State relations. Apart from the working group on Centre-State relations, all others submitted their reports in April 2007. The government had, in principle, accepted the recommendations and virtually committed itself to their implementation.

For instance, Hamid Ansari chaired the group on CBMs in the State, and it included representatives from all mainstream political parties and groups. The group's agenda included the following: measures to improve the condition of the people affected by militancy, schemes to rehabilitate all widows and orphans affected by militancy, issues relating to the relaxation of conditions which have foresworn militancy, an effective rehabilitation policy, including employment, for Kashmiri Pandit migrants, an approach considering issues relating to return of Kashmiri youth from areas controlled by Pakistan, and measures to protect and preserve the unique cultural and religious heritage of the State.

The group had recommended, among other things, a review and revocation of laws that impinge on the fundamental rights of common citizens, such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), review of cases of persons in jails and general amnesty for those under trial for minor offences, devising effective rehabilitation policies for Kashmiri Pandits and a comprehensive package to enable them to return to their original residences and for the Kashmiri youth in Pakistan-controlled areas, who may have joined militancy for monetary considerations or misguided ideological reasons, measures to strengthen the State human rights commission, and setting up of a State commission for minorities. The interlocutors' report, in no way, improves on these recommendations.

The only real value addition could have been on proposing new political ideas. And here, not only are there no novel ideas, even the proposals (borrowed mostly from other reports) are embedded in the “grand” idea of the establishment of a Constitutional Committee, to review all acts and articles of the Constitution of India extended to the State after the Delhi Agreement of 1952. In other words, the Report — on the most critical issue — passes the buck and recommends that New Delhi look for someone who is regarded in high esteem in the State and the rest of the country to do the job.

On other related issues too, the Report falls well short of expectations. The report does not give importance to delivering justice to those people wronged over the last two decades. The report also fights shy of identifying some of the other primary causes of the problems in the Jammu and Kashmir conflict: including the widespread rigging of elections, and the political high-handedness of New Delhi in J&K.

Truth and reconciliation

The report talks about the need to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). However, the report treats the whole concept of a TRC in a very casual manner. It says, for example, “even if justice cannot be provided for all victims of violence, if some of those guilty of human rights abuses, including militants, were to ask forgiveness from the families of their victims, it would provide closure for many.”

The report also suffers from a serious lack of focus. The report's recommendations address issues that trivialise the real problems of the State. For instance, by recommending inter-regional dance and theatre competitions, cultural talks about inter-regional culture, and establishing “an art gallery in Srinagar,” the interlocutors undermine the gravitas that a report of this kind should have, if it is to be taken seriously.

Finally, how does one evaluate a report of this kind? It has not managed to reach out to important segments in Kashmir, it has not produced any sort of consensus in J&K or in New Delhi, and its impact is not likely to be felt in “grand” political terms. This report, at best, is an academic exercise of little policy consequence. The fact is there exist valuable documents and reports, which have, in great detail, explained the possible trajectories for building peace in the State. It was not yet another document that we needed to resolve the multiple conflicts in the State, but a genuine political process of reconciliation between the people of the State and New Delhi. Many dissidents from the State opposed this panel of interlocutors because they believed that the group did not have a mandate to negotiate peace, and that this was merely a diversionary tactic to buy time. One-and-half-years later, they stand vindicated.

(Co-authored with Dr.Happymon Jacob)

Source: The Hindu, 04/06/12

Myths about Afghanistan

It is now becoming increasingly clear that President Barack Obama’s administration is almost desperate to forge a deal with the Taliban, against all odds. The opening of a Taliban office in Qatar and the release of high value Taliban assets from the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, it seems, are the next steps in a process of so-called ‘reconciliation’ with the Quetta Shura led by Taliban’s Amirul Momineen, Mullah Mohammad Omar. This latest initiative seems to have, at the moment, neither the full support of Afghan President Hamid Karzai nor indeed the Islamabad-Rawalpindi establishment, but this can change quickly if past experience is good evidence.

While it may be prudent for New Delhi to wait and watch, it is critical simultaneously to begin to debunk the myths on the basis of which this so-called peace process is being fostered by Washington and some of its European allies, reckless in their eagerness to get out of Afghanistan. While there are those even within the Indian establishment who are arguing for ‘keeping all options open’, there can and must be no compromise with Talibanism.

Indeed, these ‘western’ myths are built on convenient cultural stereotypes divorced from the reality of Afghanistan’s past and often disconnected from contemporary Afghan politics and society. These cultural explanations are constructed as a useful justification for policies seeking an early exit from Afghanistan.

Myth one: The majority of the Pashtuns support the Taliban; ergo let the Taliban rule Afghanistan. While it is clear that all Taliban are Pashtuns, not all Pashtuns are Taliban. The suggestion that even the majority of the Pashtuns support the Taliban is debatable. Within the complex tribal structure of the Pashtuns, the bulk of the Taliban leadership is Ghilzai which, of course, has historically been at contradictions with the equally powerful Durranis. But even within the Ghilzais, the extent of support for the Taliban has always been contested. Opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan are notoriously unreliable, but for every survey that suggests majority support for the Taliban there is another which would point to tremendous resentment against them. What is clear is that a large section of the people would support those forces that are on the ascendant or likely to control the power structure. This, of course, is not unique to Afghanistan and similar to any society that has witnessed conflict and violence over long periods of history. It is also clear that outside the Pashtuns, the Taliban have virtually no support among the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras or the smaller minorities.

Myth two: Talibanism is part of the traditional social structure of the Pashtuns; ergo let the Afghans decide what is good for them. Nothing could be further from the truth. The savage regime that the Taliban sought to impose on the people of Afghanistan is not native to the people of the country. While the Afghans are devout Muslims, it is the pre-Islamic moral and social code of Pashtunwali that still guides most of the Pashtun tribes. The ethical code of the Pashtunwali, with its emphasis on hospitality, integrity, justice, sanctuary does not resemble the radical code that the Taliban enforced during their short stint as rulers of Afghanistan. In other words, to reject Talibanism is not to reject Pashtunwali or even orthodox Islam. Talibanism was a product of the fanatical zeal of intelligence agencies seeking to produce indoctrinated robots who would follow even the most irrational order, and not rooted in the culturally rich and vibrant history of Afghanistan. To suggest that Talibanism is synonymous with Afghan culture is to show extreme ignorance of the country’s history and to display deep contempt for the people of the country.

Myth three: Violence and war are part of the Afghan way of life; ergo let the Afghans keep fighting amongst themselves. No country, no culture privileges war and violence; neither does nor has Afghanistan. The Afghans have fought invaders and occasionally been invaders themselves. But Afghanistan has an equally strong tradition of peace and non-violence. From the 13th century poet, mystic and theologian Jalaladin Muhammad Rumi to the 20th century statesman Badshah Khan, the Frontier Gandhi, the Afghans have had a tradition of thinking and articulating some of the finest ideas on pacifism and non-violence. To capsule all Afghans as violent men and women who love killing or being killed is to caricature the complex cultural diversity of the country.

Myth four: You can win a battle against the Afghan, but never a war; ergo, let us get out as soon as possible. The Afghans have indeed a fierce sense of nationalism and have fought and won their independence over centuries. But history is more complex than most contemporary commentaries of Afghan wars, including the defeat of the British in the 19th century or the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1990, would suggest. For those who want to take a more cynical view of Afghan valour it is useful to read, for instance, an account of General Hari Singh Nalwa’s campaigns against the Pashtun tribes during Maharajah Ranjit Singh’s time. In any case, these cultural explanations of history are deeply suspect. Modern armies win campaigns based on superior technology, better training, a fuller understanding of the terrain, a more refined strategy and the willingness to put soldiers on the ground. If the Americans lose the war in Afghanistan it will not be because the Afghan DNA is so resilient that it can defeat ‘any superpower’ but because the United States and its allies have neither the patience to fight a long war nor the willingness to take the suffering needed to wage and win wars.

Let us be clear, the return of the Taliban, with or without al-Qaeda and with or without an aggressive foreign policy would be the single most dangerous trend in the region. It would privilege the forces of obscurantism, create the conditions for permanent instability in Afghanistan and potentially become a source of spreading the violence of intolerance across the region. There can and must not be any reconciliation with those who represent, in every sense, the diabolic forces of evil.

(Source: The New Indian Express)

Challenges for China policy

We have entered the year of the Dragon. In Chinese astrology, the Dragon is the most powerful of signs, and an important symbol of the Han people. 2012 will be, in many ways, critical for China and for its relationship with the world. Not perhaps since the cultural revolution of the 1970s has there been as much global concern about China and so many signs of turbulence within. For Indians, the year marks the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war, probably the most humiliating in the history of independent India.

Ironically, half a century later we seem to be as muddled about our China policy, as Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was in the years before the conflict in 1962. Indeed, there is no greater challenge for Indian foreign policy in this year than the challenge to understand China – in all its complexities — and to frame policies for the next decade. And to do so, not just through the prism of western thinking, but in the light of our own experience.

In 2012, there are four key questions the answers to which may prove decisive for China and for its relationship with the outside world. First, will China’s so-called “resilient authoritarianism” — tied to the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party, unity within the party, and support of the People’s Liberation Army — survive the transition from the fourth generation leadership to the fifth generation? In November this year, at the 18th Communist Party Congress, if all goes according to plan, Xi Jinping should replace Hu Jintao as the President and Li Keqiang is expected to succeed Wen Jiabao as Premier.

Jinping belongs to the elitist Shanghai clique largely of princelings who were born to power and privilege, while Keqiang is from the populist faction who grew through the ranks of the Communist Youth League. But beyond these personalities, is the larger generational transition as well as the factionalism within the Party that will have serious implications for policy. The management of these contradictions, and the growing assertiveness of the PLA may create considerable turbulence and be responsible for increasing incoherence in Chinese policies at home and abroad.

Second, how will China make its slow but important transition from an export driven manufacturing economy (relying on cheap labour and focusing on the coastal regions) to an economy relying on domestic consumption, with an emphasis on services and the development of the hinterland? While it may be easy to dismiss Cassandra-like predictions of the Chinese economy being a bubble waiting to burst, it is obvious that China will probably face this year the most serious challenge to its growth since the late 1970s. Indeed, China’s 12th five-year plan (approved last year) itself has set targets that seem, at least at this stage, unachievable.

Third, will continued political and economic uncertainty and rising expectations translate into mass social and political unrest? 2011 was the year of protests almost across China and this is not counting the uprisings in Xinjiang and Tibet.The most recent incident in November-December 2011in Wukan, a fishing village in the prosperous province of Guangdong, may be a good indicator of growing popular restiveness. The villagers collectively took over the village, protesting against the sale of common land to property sharks. They threw out the local party leaders, and barricaded their villages in an unheard of act of collective defiance. The protests ended only after unprecedented concessions by the Party leadership.

Finally, will an increasingly insecure, new Chinese leadership — faced with growing problems at home — become more aggressive in terms of its foreign policy behaviour. 2011 witnessed a new Chinese assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, as China-watchers claimed that Beijing was abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character mantra of focusing on problems within and not becoming the centre of attention. Richard Haass, the President of the US Council on Foreign Relations, and one of the most astute observers of China recently wrote: “I have been travelling to China for more than three decades, but never have I encountered a Chinese leadership so uncertain of the country’s future. It is little exaggeration to say that the world’s most populous country is on its heels.”

These questions need to be probed in India by the government and independent scholars as much are they being probed by the rest of the world. In 2011, India witnessed what even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described as new Chinese assertiveness, reflected in the cancellation of the Border talks over the presence of the Dalai Lama at a Buddhist convention and aggressiveness over the oil exploration pact with Vietnam over the South China Sea. The larger concern about Chinese encirclement of India is also no longer fanciful.

However, the Prime Minister recently dismissed the idea of China attacking India, which brought about a sense of déja vu. Nehru’s forward policy in 1962 was based largely on the intelligence assessment that Chinese would not respond militarily to aggressive Indian patrolling. That inaccurate assessment led to the fiasco of 1962 as an unprepared army had to face the wrath of the PLA.

2012 is not 1962, for a variety of reasons including the fact that the Indian armed forces are capable of meeting strong challenges. As one way of independent scholars to participate in the China debate, in an informed way, the government should seriously consider releasing the Henderson Brookes report, which is the only authoritative in-house study of the military defeat of 1962. If there are parts that are sensitive or have a bearing on the current border negotiation they can easily be redacted. It would be a tragedy if instead of learning from our history, we are condemned to repeat it.

In sum, while tactically India seems to be responding to Chinese assertiveness with firmness, there does not seem to be a clear long-term strategy in place. The challenge of managing China is so formidable that it will require the exercise of most of our military and diplomatic resources, and yet do we have these in place?

(Source: The New Indian Express)

Beyond 1971 war euphoria

Forty years after the creation of Bangladesh, there has been — in the Indian press — an outpouring of euphoria for what many have described as India’s greatest strategic achievement since Independence. And while in military terms it was undoubtedly a major accomplishment, many of the early policy conclusions that followed the war and the India-Pakistan agreement in Shimla in 1972 were proven wrong. In other words, with the benefit of four decades of hindsight, the Bangladesh War may have been a great tactical victory, but the strategic fruits that were to follow, especially, in terms of long-term peace in South Asia are still not on the table.

The humiliating defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war, the dismemberment of the state, and the Shimla Agreement of 1972 are now widely viewed as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s greatest contribution to the nation. The debates, if any, have focused primarily on the role played by various institutions in creating and executing the policy which resulted, inter alia, in General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the Indian Eastern Army commander accepting the Instrument of Surrender from the head of the Pakistani forces, General A A K Niazi, on December 16, 1971 at Dhaka.

Till a decade or so ago, in many an army mess the roles played by Aurora, General J F R Jacob (the chief of staff, Eastern Command) and the army chief, General (and later Field Marshall) S H F J Manekshaw used to be hotly debated. Jacob has since written his version of the war. Within the intelligence agencies, it is R N Kao, founding head of R&AW who is lionised and the brilliant strategic analyst B Raman has reminded us of the contributions of spymasters whose analysis (and the role played in the creation of the Mukti Bahini) was critical, including the vital inputs of K Sankaran Nair, Brigadier Hassanwalia, Major General Uban, and Gary Saxena. There is also a larger historical debate, which will continue to be played out, on the thinking, planning and objectives of the Indian leadership, and the role-played by the outside powers, especially the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

What has grabbed less attention is the expectations within the establishment about the larger strategic consequences of the 1971 victory and Shimla. There must have been at least three expectations. First that as a consequence of 1971, Pakistan and indeed the entire region would recognise the superiority of Indian military and would be unwilling to take the risk of confronting India. It was hoped that not only would the 1962 debacle of the Chinese war and the stalemate of the Indo-Pak war of 1965 be erased from the collective memory of the region, but that the smaller states would begin to accept the dominant role that India would play in the region to the exclusion of outside states (almost an Indian Monroe doctrine). Second that there would be a settlement of Jammu and Kashmir with the LoC becoming the de facto international border. Indira Gandhi’s then secretary, P N Dhar has confirmed that Z A B Bhutto, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, had agreed to this unwritten understanding at Shimla. And finally that Pakistan as a state would reform itself in at least two ways. One, by accepting that the creation of Bangladesh had proven the fallacy of the two-nation theory and of the role of religion as a binding force for nationhood. Thus it was expected that Pakistan would devolve greater power to the provinces and move beyond Islam as the raison d’être of the state.

Finally, there was the hope that Pakistan and especially the Pakistan army would also transcend its pathological India hostility. To prevent a Versailles type syndrome (the combative nationalism that was witnessed in Germany after its humiliating defeat in the World War I) Indira Gandhi not only treated Bhutto with utmost respect and regard at Shimla, but agreed to repatriate thousands of Pakistani Prisoners of War without any conditions and did not insist on a written agreement on Jammu and Kashmir. P N Haksar, Indira Gandhi’s adviser with a great sense of history apparently was principally instrumental in ensuring that Bhutto went back after Shimla, a hero to his people rather than a discredited leader of a defeated nation.

In retrospect, these expectations were either misplaced or subsequent Indian policies did not build sufficiently on the 1971 and 1972 achievements. Not only was Indian power not recognised in the years after 1971 by Pakistan, but also many of the smaller states, including Sri Lanka, thought of crafty ways of challenging Indian dominance. In the years that followed the assassination of Sheikh Mujib (the father of its independence movement), Bangladesh itself became — in cycles — a source of grave instability for India and was once the favourite hunting ground of ISI agents. The jury, unfortunately, is still out on whether the current bonhomie in bilateral relations will outlast present Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. In Pakistan itself, the Bangladesh War — contrary to Haksar’s hopes — became the new Versailles. The Bangladesh syndrome arguably produced the policy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’ as avenging 1971 became the principal unstated doctrine of the Pakistan army. Changing borders was no longer taboo, and Bangladesh gave a perverse institutional legitimacy to Pakistan army’s designs to do the same to India.

Religion instead of becoming epithermal to the Pakistani state, overwhelmed it. General Zia-ul-Haq’s years (that followed the military coup against Bhutto) led to a new radicalisation (aided by the Afghan war) and produced a generation of extremists that have permeated into all institutions of the state, including the army. Bhutto himself reneged on any understanding on Jammu and Kashmir that he may had in Shimla, and subsequent leaders of Pakistan helped to create the monster of militancy (aided by our own follies) in J&K that has almost permanently scarred the psyche of the people of the state.

In sum, as we celebrate a milestone in the history of nation — which we hope will be peaceful and prosperous — the Bangladesh syndrome is more than just about victories and agreements. Bangladesh perhaps teaches us that unless political, diplomatic, economic and social initiatives build on military victories, they can remain ephemeral.

(Source: The New Indian Express)