The idea of India in the U.S.

Next week, health permitting, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee will undertake probably the most significant foreign 'yatra' of his political career.

This nearly fortnight-long trip to the United States could be a milestone in the history of bilateral relations, and yet it is a visit that that some have dubbed as unnecessary and irrelevant. Others have suggested that this new engagement with the U.S. goes against the principles that have traditionally guided India's foreign policy. All this is pure baloney, articulated by those who belong to the dustbin of history, or those apparatchiks who still yearn for the old days of Stalinist communism.

Let us face some hard facts. There is arguably no other relationship that is as critical to India today as the one with the U.S., and dubbing anyone who says this to be a CIA agent will not change the truth. The U.S. is the only real superpower in the international system, and its hegemony is unlikely to be challenged - even by a determined China - for the next 25 years.

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been a key player in the international relations of Asia and will continue to exercise a vital influence on the region in the future as well. Additionally, the U.S. remains India's largest trading partner, and is the single most attractive destination for skilled human capital from India.

Admittedly, while India and the U.S., the largest democracies in the world, have often been viewed natural allies, it is estrangement rather than engagement that seems to have defined relations between New Delhi and Washington through much of the last half century. Also, the Pokhran II nuclear tests by India in May 1998 reduced Indo-U.S. relations to a new low point.

Is this beginning to change? Strident anti-Americanism remains a feature of Indian public opinion and the U.S. still seems unwilling, it seems, to recognize those Indian security concerns, particularly over China and the nuclear nexus between Beijing and Islamabad, that find expression in its nuclear policy. But there are signs of change.

India and the U.S. have sustained a high-level strategic dialogue for nearly two years. During the Kargil war of 1999, the U.S. displayed an unprecedented sensitivity to India's security concerns. New Delhi and Washington, both key targets of Islamic terrorism, have formed a joint working group on the issue. More computer professionals from India were given H1B work permits in the U.S. last year than citizens of any other country, and Indians played a vital role in making U.S. industry Y2K compliant.

The extremely successful Indian expatriate community in the U.S. is playing an important role in bringing the two nations together. Both countries have a stake in the role that China plays in the Asia-Pacific region in the future and in ensuring the stability of Pakistan. Washington seems to increasingly be accepting India as a nuclear-weapons power. President Clinton's trip to India, earlier this year, was an enormous success.

In short, both the present and the potential future make the relationship with the U.S. vital for Indian interests. True, Vajpayee will be meeting President Clinton when he is virtually legless. In about two months a new president would have been elected, and in about four there will be a new occupant in the White House. But the Vajpayee visit must not be narrowly viewed in terms of engaging the current Democratic administration. The trip should be (and presumably is) about engaging America and cementing the gains made over the last two years.

The Vajpayee visit, more specifically, must be viewed in terms of four missions. First, it is about reaching out to American business. U.S. corporations, viewed for years as exploiters and unreliable partners, can become India's most vital allies if the relationship of mutual dependence that exists can find firmer roots.

The example of China should be of extraordinary significance. Perhaps the only real reason for American reluctance to take a harder stand toward Chinese irresponsibility on a score of issues, including their dubious record on nonproliferation, has been the relationship of enormous economic interdependence. It is relationship that a forward-thinking India could prudently emulate.

Second, the Vajpayee visit should also be about reaching out to Indian Americans. Indians in the U.S. are arguably the country's most valuable assets in America. They are on the verge of becoming a powerful economic force, and - with some direction - could emerge as a powerful lobby for Indian interests. While it is difficult to imagine Indian Americans having the same influence as, say, the Jewish lobby, there is enormous scope for them to play a role, and perhaps even a decisive one at that, in shaping U.S. policy toward India.

Third, the Vajpayee visit should also be about reaching out to the policy community, including, but not only, the lawmakers in Congress. Vajpayee is addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress, and his speech must reflect the vitality and the openness of the "new" India, and its willingness to share American responsibility in the management of the international system. India is ready to be a partner in the quest for global stability, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, which promises to witness turbulence in the years to come, and Vajpayee must stress this without mincing words.

Finally, Vajpayee must also engage the two most important presidential candidates, Al Gore and George W. Bush, and their aides. Meetings are scheduled with both Gore and Bush, and these occasions must be used to establish a personal bond, and put India on the road map for a future American president.

(Source: indiainfo.com)

Gore versus Bush: Who will engage India?

In about two months the United States will have elected its new president. It is still not clear whether the eventual winner will be Al Gore or George W. Bush. Till recently, nearly every opinion poll had Bush leading Gore by more than ten points, and many analysts had almost assumed that the Republicans would return to power after eight years.

But that judgment seems to have been made prematurely, and the Democratic convention has lead to a major swing for Gore. Some opinion polls now have the Gore-Lieberman ticket running ahead of the Bush-Cheney one. On present evidence, this presidential election may be one of the closest in American history.

It is one of the ironies of American politics that despite the fact that the American people are generally experiencing unprecedented prosperity -- and economic issues normally dominate most U.S. elections -- it is by no means certain that Gore, despite this latest surge in his favor, will occupy the Oval Office next January.

Political pundits attribute this contradiction to two factors. First, public exhaustion (and disgust) with the controversies that surrounded Bill Clinton during his two terms, especially the sex scandal with Monika Lewinsky. Second, Gore's own lack of charisma.

While Gore is a gifted cerebral politician with an impeccable background and with fine political training, he lacks the warmth, the color and the verve to reach out to people who do not share his background.

The added irony is that had Clinton himself been running again, which is prohibited by the American constitution, he may have won again. The reason is simple. There has been rarely in any political arena a politician so brilliant as Clinton, or as charismatic as him.

We Indians cannot rubbish this. Recall the impact of Clinton's address to the joint session of the two houses of Parliament. Our parliamentarians nearly mobbed him and were clearly in such great awe of Clinton that one analyst suggested that had the American president asked the lawmakers to sign the CTBT then and there they would have done so without raising an eyebrow.

In other words, Gore is burdened by the Clinton legacy, but does not have the personal charm of the incumbent president to be able to transcend the controversies that surrounded the White House during the last eight years.

Not surprisingly, Gore has chosen Joseph Lieberman as his running mate. Lieberman, an orthodox Jew, is regarded as the moral conscience of the United States and was a strident critic of Clinton during the Lewinsky saga.

But which will be better for India? A Democratic administration led by Gore or a Republican one under Bush?

In many ways, Gore is going to be more predictable. His stance on most issues is well known, and even leaders of other countries have become familiar with his style of working. But is this enough? True, there will be a greater continuity to the U.S-India dialogue if there is a Gore administration, but it will be without the benefit of individuals whose personal interest made all the difference.

It is highly unlikely that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, for instance, will find a place in a Gore government. Talbot is a brilliant analyst, and has a fine understanding of the politics of arms control, but he was in government because of his close personal friendship with Clinton, which goes back to their Oxford days when both of them were Rhode Scholars at the University.

Gore, who probably recognizes Talbot's qualities, will still not keep him because of the overwhelming need to demonstrate that he is his own man and that the Clinton days are finally over.

Let us also be clear that it was Talbot who demonstrated the sensitivity and sophistication to not only engage India in a meaningful dialogue, but also to develop a personal relationship with External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, which was vital to furthering Indo-US relations.

Without Talbot, it may well mean a return to the bad old days of absolutist positions, especially on the nuclear issue. Make no mistake: the Gore camp is full of the same kind of non-proliferation 'wallahs' who have been the bane of Indo-US relations through most of the 1990s.

In addition, Gore comes with the huge baggage of environmental issues, which might translate into problems in trading relations with developing countries and may even see the possible introduction of environment-related non-tariff barriers.

Add to this list the bleeding-heart liberals (so close to Gore) concern for human rights in Kashmir and elsewhere, and you may have the perfect recipe for a disastrous U.S.- India relationship under a Gore administration.

Where will US-India relations go under a Bush administration? Although it is difficult to chart a definite course, there seems to be some evidence that the Republicans may locate the relationship on a firmer ground. There are at least three reasons for this optimism.

First, the Republicans are more concerned about the future of China, and its possible emergence as a belligerent and revisionist superpower that will seek to challenge American influence and power, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Many Republicans are beginning to recognize that India, with its own deep concerns about China, could be one vital counter weight to the Dragon. This may mean that a Republican administration will be more sensitive to Indian security concerns, and more willing to accommodate India's own aspirations to be a great power.

Second, the Republicans, although no less concerned about proliferation of nuclear weapons, may have a less absolutist view of India's nuclear policy. Most important, given their own skepticism about the CTBT, the pressure for India to sign the treaty is bound to ease considerably.

Finally, while Bush may not have a great understanding of foreign policy, his team of foreign policy advisors is amongst the most scholarly and analytical in the U.S. This includes the former Stanford Professor, Condolisa Rice, and Richard Haas of the Brookings Institution. Both Rice and Haas have a healthy respect for India, and recognize the importance of forging a close strategic partnership with New Delhi.

(Source: indiainfo.com)

A lesson for Pakistan

In Kashmir's recent history, rarely have either militants or policymakers demonstrated real courage. But two very brave decisions were made recently. The decision of the Hizbul Mujahideen to announce a unilateral ceasefire for three months, followed by an invitation from the Government of India for unconditional talks, will probably be remembered as one of the most courageous acts in recent years.

It is very easy to make war, even cowards can kill. But, to make peace requires real valor, and both the Hizbul - despite its history of terror - and the Government of India - despite its known ad hocism over Kashmir - have shown tremendous strength. The challenge is now to translate the Hizbul's ceasefire, and the government's offer of a dialogue, into sustainable peace on the ground, although there is some evidence to suggest that, at least in the short term, the violence by other groups may increase as a result of the ceasefire.

The Hizbul's decision for a ceasefire is important for at least three reasons. First, the Hizbul was easily the strongest Kashmir militant group operating in Jammu and Kashmir, as distinct from the primarily foreign groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayba, Harkat-ul-Mujhaideen or the more recently created Jesh-e-Mohammad. Although considerably weakened since its peak in the early 1990s, it still boasted of an impressive cadre of nearly a thousand militants.

After its decision to cease fire, there are no longer any Kashmiri militant groups of substance operating in the state. Recall that local arm of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the other major militant group, had announced a ceasefire over five years ago. But this had led to a split within the JKLF with Yasin Malik, based in Srinagar, and Amanullah Khan, based in Rawalpindi, heading the two factions, with the former having renounced violence.

Second, the Hizbul had, at one stage, a huge following within Kashmir, and continued to have some influence on the Kashmiri mindset. The JKLF's support was restricted primarily to the urban areas, while the Hizbul's following extended to the rural areas. Due to its close connection with the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Hizbul was able to tap into a huge network of madrasas. The Hizbul also was one of the main sources of logistical support for the Pakistanis and Afghans who came as part of the Harkat or the Lashkar. The Amir of the Hizbul, Syed Salahuddin, was also the supremo of the United Jehad Council based in Pakistan.

With the decision to cease fire, not only will the network of Jehadi groups be considerably weakened, but also the ordinary Kashmiris can feel confident enough to openly reject the gun, which was not possible for fear of reprisals by the militant groups, especially the Hizbul.

Finally, the Hizbul's rise was rooted in the politics of J&K. Syed Salahuddin, also known as Yusuf Shah, had contested the 1987 elections to the J&K Assembly, and had lost, it is widely believed, because of massive rigging. The militancy was sparked off by the malpractices during that election, and the supporters of Salahuddin were among the first militants. The famous HAJY group (Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Majid, Javed Mir and Yasin Malik) that initiated the JKLF, for instance, were polling agents for Salahuddin. The Hizbul's rejection of violence, albeit temporarily, signals a gradual return of the disaffected to non-violent democratic politics, although from still outside the mainstream.

Why did the Hizbul choose to announce a ceasefire now? What were the motivations behind the decision? The most important factor was public opinion. Kashmiri public sentiment against violence is at an all time high, and militancy has lost the legitimacy that it had once acquired.

Majid Dar, the leader of the Hizbul who announced the ceasefire at a news conference in the outskirts of Kashmir, pointed out that a high-level team of the Hizbul had come back to the Valley about three months ago and held discussions with field operational commanders and other prominent Hizbul leaders. According to him, "The wishes of the people were also gauged, and it was realized that the desire for a peaceful solution among all sections of society including the local political leadership" was all pervasive.

No less important was the fatigue and exhaustion of the Hizbul cadre. For more than a decade, the Hizbul has faced the wrath of the Indian security forces, and faced heavy casualties during this period. They have not been able to replace their fast diminishing cadre, because Kashmiri youth are unwilling to join the ranks of the militant group.

Recently, the successes of the security forces against the Hizbul had increased, and - some believe - that had the operations against the military group continued with the same ferocity, the Hizbul would have faced extinction within a year or so. To add to its woes was the manner in which Pakistan's ISI was marginalizing it, and pushing forward the dreaded Lashkar and the Harkat, who were believed to have a more motivated group of Pakistani and Afghan fighters.

It is also possible that sustained pressure from the Americans on Pakistan and Pakistan's own desire to present a moderate face to the West (and to get India to the negotiating table) may also have contributed to the Hizbul's decision to cease fire. It may well be that the Hizbul's decision, primarily motivated by local factors, may have received some support within elements in the Pakistani establishment who were under pressure from the United States. This may have facilitated the news conference by Syed Salahuddin in Islamabad.

The real test of Pakistan's moderation is not, however, in the Hizbul's ceasefire, but only once the Laskhar and Harkat also announce a similar decision. On present evidence, however, these jehadi groups are likely to escalate the violence in order to demonstrate that the Hizbul's ceasefire does not count for much.

It was wise of India to offer to hold unconditional talks with the Hizbul. Any group who is willing to eschew violence should be welcomed to the negotiating table. And only when Pakistan is willing to similarly condemn all acts of violence, and stop aiding and abetting violence, should it be accorded a similar invitation.

(Source: indiainfo.com)

Big Brother's secret meddling in Kashmir

Is the United States secretly mediating to resolve the Kashmir issue? Ever since US President Bill Clinton's hugely successful visit to India, a variety of reports - from a diversity of sources - have suggested that Washington has been quietly playing a decisive role in Kashmir. It is even being suggested that the Clinton administration is behind New Delhi's "new" initiatives in Kashmir.

n the Kashmir Valley, particularly, this has created heightened popular expectations that a final solution to the "Kashmir dispute" is round the corner. Much of this is baloney. While it is clear that the US remains deeply "interested" in Kashmir, there are clear limits to its involvement. Not only are current American interests in Kashmir rather limited, but the US leverage vis-�-vis New Delhi or Islamabad, particularly on Kashmir, is also vastly exaggerated.

To be sure, America had a deep interest in the future of Kashmir during the Cold War. Pakistan was an ally, and had acceded to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which was later renamed the Central Treaty Organization. And Kashmir had a unique geo-strategic location. Declassified American sources suggest that the idea of an independent Kashmir was seriously explored (and promoted) within the State Department and the CIA.

An undivided, independent Kashmir would share borders with five countries: the erstwhile Soviet Union, China, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. It could well have served as a vital listening post to monitor both communist China and the Soviet Union, and, with crafty manipulation and luck, may have even become an American military base.

In the 1950s, suspicion about American policy on Kashmir had reached such a level that in 1953, Sheikh Abdullah - the Wazir-e-Azam of Jammu and Kashmir - was dismissed, it is believed, after he had a series of meetings in Srinagar with Adlai Stevenson, who was touring Kashmir (among other places) after having lost the American presidential election. Indian intelligence operatives, it seemed, had "listened" to their conversations, and had concluded that Stevenson had assured Abdullah of American support for an independent Kashmir.

After it became clear that there were few takers for an independent Kashmir (not even Islamabad), the Americans continued to support Pakistan's demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. It was only because of a sustained Soviet veto, after the mid-1950s, that the United Nations Security Council was not able to press for an enforcement of earlier resolutions on Kashmir.

Suspicions about official American thinking on Kashmir were resuscitated in the early-1990s, after the end of the Cold War. This time, however, there were no great strategic interests at stake: The Cold War was over, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, China was almost an ally, and there were easier gateways to Central Asia than through Kashmir.

It was, however, the bleeding heart liberals of the Clinton administration, who - it seemed - were deeply disturbed by the new troubles in Kashmir, and outraged by the alleged human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces while combating the insurgency, who again raised the slogan o an independent Kashmir.
What made things worse was the presence of Robin Raphel - the first ever assistant secretary of state for South Asia - in the first Clinton administration. Raphel had been a political counselor in the American embassy, and despite the knowledge that as a 'friend of Bill' she was destined for higher positions, had been largely ignored by the protocol-conscious mandarins of the Ministry of External Affairs.

The Kashmiri militants and collaterals in the Pakistan embassy had, however, been smarter and more politically astute. They had, over delicious Kashmiri "gushtabas" and Peshawari "naans," convinced Raphel of their cause. Not surprisingly, at one of her first off-the-record briefings as assistant secretary, Raphel set the Ganges on fire, by stating that the official position of the US was that "the accession of Kashmir to India was disputed." India's suspicions seemed to be confirmed: The Liberal trail for an independent Kashmir ran from Adlai Stevenson to Robin Raphel.

This, of course, was wide exaggeration. Bleeding Liberals can mouth slogans, but real American national interest determines policy. And there was no real American national interest in Kashmir; at worst, Kashmir was a stick to use to put pressure on India on the nonproliferation issue.

What, then, is the position today? Quite clearly, America has interests in preventing a war in South Asia, given, particularly, the presence of nuclear weapons. A war in South Asia could be deeply destabilizing for the international system, and every hegemonic power would be deeply concerned about such a possibility.

Washington is also deeply concerned about the Islamic jehadis in Pakistan, who are unleashing terror in regions beyond South Asia and are explicitly targeting the US. Also, there are significant lobbies in the US as well as self-styled do-gooders who want a resolution of the Kashmir problem, and want to see a greater US involvement. The most prominent of these do-gooders is Farooq Kahthwari, a Kashmiri businessman who is currently the chief executive of the chain of American furniture stories, Ethel Allen.

Kathwari, a few years ago, commissioned the Kashmiri Study Group, whose members included a number of American Congressmen and academics, to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. The Study Group has come out with a number of "ideal" solutions. The latest, however, is a much-diluted plan for an autonomous, secular, democratic Kashmir, sovereign but without an international personality, and in practical terms existing as a protectorate within India. It is Kathwari who has made a spate of recent visit to the subcontinent and Kashmir.

Post the Clinton visit, however, there is a clear convergence of interests between Indian and the US over Kashmir. Both realize that Islamic fundamentalism poses a deep danger to stability in South Asia. New Delhi has realized that there is a need to embark on an imaginative policy to win the hearts and the minds of the Kashmiri people. This has the support of Washington.

Neither Washington nor New Delhi believes that borders can be rewritten in South Asia and will be limited to putting pressure on Pakistan to stop aiding and abetting militants in Kashmir, while supporting India's initiatives aimed at an internal package of autonomy. The Kashmir Study Group's latest plan is the latest evidence of the limits of US policy. 

  (Source: indiainfo.com)

Tourists are pouring into Kashmir

 The rush at the airline counter at Delhi airport makes it almost impossible to believe that we are all undertaking a journey to "the most dangerous place on earth." "Are you not scared to travel to Kashmir?"

 I ask a group from Singapore, whose joi de vivre is scary, rather than infectious. A middle-aged woman seems intrigued: "Is there any trouble there?" Before I can conclude that these are victims of a devious travel agent, a younger woman, probably the daughter, interrupts: "We are dare devils! We will go anywhere!" 

There is no further opportunity to seek a detailed explanation from these adventurers, who are probably seeking an escape from Lee Kuan Yew's painfully boring paradise.

These dare devils are not alone. Flights to Srinagar are full, with about a thousand passengers, mostly tourists, arriving everyday. And they are visible almost everywhere in Srinagar, especially on the boulevard on the shores of the Dal Lake, despite the ubiquitous presence of gun-toting security personnel.

Many domestic tourists are arriving by road, ignorant of or impervious to the risks of landmines and improvised explosive devices, that recently killed an important minister of the state government near the national highway.

Some of them were visiting Vaishno Devi - a few hours away from the Kashmir Valley - which over the last decade has become one of the most popular Hindu shrines, and were lured by drivers in Tata Sumos, who have special arrangements with houseboats on the Dal and Nageen lakes.

"Get a taste of paradise, before it goes away. Only for Rs 500" is one catchy marketing slogan. And seven innocent tourists are herded into one Sumo.

But not all takers of the Tata Sumo package entirely buy the marketing strategy. "We came here because there is a BJP government at the Centre and L K Advani is Home Minister. We feel safe and completely secure," declared a group from Andhra Pradesh, as they walked down from the ancient Shankaracharya temple, with vermilion marks on their foreheads.

The tourist industry is cautiously optimistic. The umbrella separatist organization, the All Party Hurriyat Conference, has declared that tourists are welcome to visit the valley, and the state government's Tourism Department is offering a 30 per cent rebate to all visitors.

Yet, the caution remains. "The tourist season had picked up last year too, but then Kargil happened and the flights were stopped and the tourist traffic plummeted," pointed out one local businessman. Tourist operators feel this season will be the most decisive.

"If no major incident happens then the real tourists will come back next year."

The real tourists are, of course, the Japanese, the Germans and the Americans, with yens, marks and dollars to throw - or so is the nostalgic memory of the good old days.

The violence has not stopped. Not a day passes without at least half-a-dozen killings of militants, innocents or security personnel in the Valley. But the scale of random violence has gone down. The militants are choosing specific targets, usually politicians or security personnel, and the chances of innocents getting caught in the crossfire are far less than they were even a couple of years ago.

And although ordinary Kashmiris do complain of harassment at the hands of security forces, there is no doubt that the number of human rights violations, and especially custodial killings, has also not gone up - at least according to official statistics.

And yet there is a growing impression within Kashmir that a deliberate attempt is being made by vested interests to drive a wedge between different communities that had lived harmoniously for centuries together. They point out that the first casualty were the Kashmiri Pandits; select killings, rumors and a systematic campaign led to their exodus in the early 1990s.

Early this year, the massacre of Sikhs at Chattisinghpura had almost led to mass migration of this minority community from the Valley, but fortunately the Muslims reassured them successfully.And only recently, there was a bomb blast during a meeting Shia Muslims, in which at least a dozen people were killed and a prominent Shia leader was injured.

In Kashmir's deeply suspicious atmosphere, fingers are pointed everywhere, often with little evidence. And yet the truth remains that Kashmir's cultural ethos, that blended Sufi Islam, Mahayana Buddhism and Shaivite Hinduism into a composite identity, is in deep danger, and distrust between communities is at an all-time high.

Srinagar is buzzing after Home Minister L K Advani's offer of a dialogue with the separatist All Party Hurriyat Conference. Most intellectuals, who spoke at a high-powered seminar in Srinagar, felt that the dialogue should be unconditional (Advani had made his offer conditional on the Hurriyat accepting the talks within the framework of the Indian Constitution), but accepted that "tripartite talks" between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris (as the Hurriyat has demanded) were fanciful.

Expectations are high and almost every Kashmiri is hoping that a way could be quickly found to ensure permanent peace after all these years of deep turmoil.

Intellectuals, academics and other members of civil society, who had earlier locked themselves in a shell, are today coming out and speaking for themselves. This is a healthy sign, and it does mean that the silent majority can no longer be ignored.

But what about Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah? Even as the high-powered seminar was going on, virtually next door, Abdullah was playing his 18 rounds of golf, unconcerned, but watched by almost a convoy of security forces.

He knows very well that until the separatists really come round to making a deal with the Centre, still a remote possibility, he can continue being the Emperor of Kashmir, with his fleet of aircraft, his satellite phones and his security entourage. 


(Source: indiainfo.com)

Changing the power equations

Indian President K R Naraynan's forthcoming visit to China may turn out to be more than purely ceremonial. But only if Narayanan, as an old China hand, does actually try and put Sino-Indian relations on a more rational footing, and seeks answers from Beijing, that the latter has evaded ever since Rajiv Gandhi fully normalised relations with the People's Republic in 1988.

Visits by Indian leaders to China have, in recent years, been often marred by controversies. The last Indian presidential visit was in 1992, when the Chinese almost disrupted President R Venkatraman's travels by conducting a nuclear test while he was there.

Earlier, Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit in 1979 had to be cut short after China announced its invasion of Vietnam during the visit. Incidentally, it was President Narayanan who was ambassador to Beijing during the ill-fated Vajpayee visit.

Narayanan had been appointed ambassador to China in 1976, fourteen years after ambassadorial relations were withdrawn. While China has "officially" described these incidents as pure coincidences, we shall have to wait and see if similar accidents happen during the Narayanan visit.

In any case, it is time that Narayanan, with his newly acquired bluntness (on particular display during the recent banquet speech in honor of US President Clinton) decided to ask China some hard questions.

First, what is the state of Chinese nuclear cooperation with Pakistan? From the perspective of India, the most serious concern vis-�-vis China is about the help provided by Beijing to Pakistan's nuclear programme. The true extent of the Beijing-Islamabad nuclear collusion may never be revealed, but it is clear that Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme has relied enormously on China's help, and Chinese nuclear engineers too may have designed Islamabad's nuclear weapons. Nuclear cooperation of this kind is unprecedented in the history of international relations since 1945; indeed, not even the US and Britain shared such a relationship.

Why would China want to help Pakistan to become a nuclear weapon state? India's elite feels that Beijing has consistently regarded a nuclear-armed Pakistan as a crucial regional ally and as a vital counterweight to India's growing capabilities. Is this true? And is cooperation continuing despite the nuclear tests by Pakistan? Are the reports, that Pakistani nuclear scientists are still being trained in various academies in China, false?

Narayanan must also ask his hosts: What accounts for Chinese unwillingness to settle any of the bilateral irritants to which India attaches importance? Despite repeated promises, Beijing has still not recognised Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim as a part of India. This, despite the number of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) introduced , largely based on unilateral Indian concessions. And why has China continued to violate the letter and spirit of the bilateral CBMs in the last few years, especially but not only, in the Ladakh sector?

Third, should India not be concerned about Chinese inroads into Myanmar, including the reported construction of a Chinese naval facility on the Coco islands, which could be used to monitor missile launches by India? Why is Beijing, in any case, seeking to establish such a large military presence in Myanmar?

Fourth, what really is the story behind the departure of the 14-year-old Ugyen Thinley Dorje, the 17th Karmapa of the Kagyupa sect of Tibetan Buddhism - from his monastery in Tsurphu near Lhasa in Tibet to the capital-in-exile of the Dalai Lama near Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh? Is it part of a Chinese plot to subvert the Tibetan movement in India? Or is it one more proof of the scale of Chinese atrocities in the region? And what does China really expect New Delhi to do with the Tibetans?

Fifth, is it not a fact that China has deployed nuclear missiles in Tibet that clearly have one target: India. Admittedly, Chinese inter-continental ballistic missiles elsewhere could also target India, but the potential political and psychological impact of these missiles - literally a few miles from India's border - during a future conflict cannot be underestimated. If China sees India as neither a rival nor an enemy, where is the need to deploy these missiles?

Sixth, why is China the only nuclear-weapon-state that continues to adopt a hard line toward India's nuclear policy? While the other nuclear states have, more or less, come to terms with India's new nuclear status, following the nuclear tests of 1998, why is it that Beijing alone keeps on harping on UN Security Resolutions? Indeed, why is it that the seniormost Chinese official, dealing with nuclear-related issues, Ambassador Sha, takes such a belligerent stand against India in international forums?

Seven, what is the Chinese stand on terrorism, especially the kind inspired by Islamic militants? Is China not facing problems related to Islamic terrorism in its northern province of Xinjiang, and which seems to have been rooted in Pakistan? If so, why is it that Chinese officials are not willing to condemn this terrorism on Indian soil? And why is it that while India spearheads the moves to prevent the adoption of resolutions, in the UN Commission on Human Rights, that condemn Chinese human rights record, Beijing is unwilling to adopt a clearer stand on Kashmir?

Eight, what is the Chinese view of multi-polarity, and what place does India occupy in Chinese cosmology? Does China see India as a partner in a united quest for a more equitable multi-polar international system? Or does it view New Delhi as a rival for influence in Asia? If the former is the case, why is Beijing not willing to openly and forthrightly support India's bid for membership of the UN Security Council? Has it so easily forgotten how India, sometimes totally alone, fought for Beijing's membership of the Security Council?

If President Narayanan were to ask these questions, and hopefully get some reasonable answers, he will do a greater service to Sino-Indian relations than can be performed by the number of toasts that will most surely be raised during his visit to the 'inscrutable' land. 

The success story of LTTE

The LTTE's dream of an independent "Eelam" may not be easily realized, but it is clear that the Sri Lankan army too will find it very difficult to militarily defeat the LTTE. Not surprisingly, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga revealed recently that she had offered to hold talks with LTTE leader V Prabhakaran at least three times during the last two years, but he had rejected all efforts at a peaceful negotiated settlement of the ethnic war. Indeed, despite the LTTE being declared a terrorist organization by virtually every important state in the international system, it still continues to be the most powerful Tamil political organization in the world with supporters in virtually every part of the globe. It is believed that LTTE raises more funds overseas, especially in Europe and North America, than any militant organization in South Asia.

What accounts for the Tigers' success and the failure of successive Sri Lankan governments to combat them effectively? There are at least three reasons for the LTTE's continued strength. First, the Tamil Tigers have a formidable military presence. Estimates about numbers vary, but it is generally believed that the organization has a cadre of at least 5,000 men and women. The LTTE consists of four wings: army, navy, anti-aircraft wing, and Black Tiger wing, which consists of members who sacrifice their own lives in suicide attacks on major military installations and political leaders. It was a member of the Black Tiger wing who was responsible for the suicide attack that killed Rajiv Gandhi.

The Tigers' military strength is also rooted in the fact that they have, over time, been trained by some of the most effective intelligence agencies in the world, including Israel's Mossad, India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Pakistan's ISI. Indeed, at one stage in 1989, they were supplied with arms and information even by the Sri Lankan army, which wanted them to defeat the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) that had been deployed there. This was revealed recently by Sri Lankan army officer Lt Priyalal Wishwakumar, who claimed that he had personally delivered four truckloads of T-56 automatic rifles to the Tigers on the instructions of then President Premadasa. However, once the IPKF had moved out, the same weapons were used to slaughter members of the Sri Lankan armed forces.

Quite clearly, Prabhakaran's leadership has been extremely important in the success of the Tigers. While the world views him as a fascist dictator, to the Tigers he is the "supremo," the elder brother in whom they have reposed complete faith.

Prabhakaran's heroes include Alexander, Napoleon, Subhash Chandra Bose, Bhagat Singh and Bal Gangadhara Tilak. By all accounts, he is a brilliant military strategist, as well as deeply feared and respected by the cadre. Ruthless and temperamental, Prabhakaran is totally uncompromising in his demand for an independent sovereign Eelam. 

Finally, whether we like it or not, the LTTE still seems to speak for many Tamils, especially those who have, over the years, faced discrimination and persecution at the hands of the Sri Lankan state. Most other Tamil organizations are inactive or dead. Recall that Prabhakaran set up LTTE, also known as the Tamil National Army, in May 1976 after growing Tamil anger and frustration with the policies of the Sri Lankan government. Indeed, the Tamils' alienation goes back to the late 1950s after the government led by Solomon Bandaranaike, father of the present president, enacted the "Sinhala only" law, making, with one stroke of the pen, the significant Tamil-speaking minority, concentrated mostly in the North and the East, second class citizens.Asia.

But it was legislation which was designed to cut the number of Tamils in universities, and which gave Buddhism the foremost place in the country in the 1970s, that led to the deep political and social discontent within the Tamils. This was compounded by the anti-Tamil riots of the late 1970s and the massive human rights violations that were inflicted by the Sri Lankan army in the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of Tamils fled the country, many as refugees to India, and countless others were killed.

The LTTE has successfully snuffed out most moderate Tamil voices. Dissent is rarely tolerated and any Tamil organization or leader who participates in electoral politics becomes an automatic target. One of the recent victims was charismatic lawyer Neelan Tiruchelvam. The Sri Lankan government may have only contempt for it, the world may despise it, but there unfortunately is no alternative to dealing with the Tigers if sustainable peace has to be achieved in Sri Lanka.

India's policy must be predicated on three critical elements: First, a firm pledge to the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka; second, a commitment to minority rights, pluralism and secular democracy in the state; and opposition to external intervention in the island. If India has to play a role, it must primarily aim at getting the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government together at the negotiating table.


(Source: indiainfo.com)