Those who had
expected the Modi foreign policy doctrine to be defined by a new muscularity
will probably be disappointed. Instead, it suggests a thoughtful understanding
of smart power, an integrated approach that will best serve India in a complex,
interdependent world
Power is the ability to influence the
behaviour of others. In international relations, as the Harvard academic,
Joseph Nye, reminds us, power can be exercised in three ways: by threatening or
actually using military force, by offering economic incentives or imposing
economic sanctions, or by building what Nye famously dubbed “soft power.” That
is, the “soft power” of nations to persuade others based on the attractiveness
of their technology, politics, culture, ideas or ideals.
Modi doctrine’s five
elements
If President Pranab Mukherjee’s
opening address to Parliament is anything to go by, the foreign policy of the
new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi will likely employ a nuanced
combination of all three of Nye’s instruments of international influence. All
those who had expected the Modi foreign policy doctrine to be defined by a new
muscularity or even machtpolitik — the wielding of the
conventional stick — will probably be disappointed. Instead, there will be a
renewed emphasis on using the carrots of economic levers and soft power. This
suggests a thoughtful understanding of the importance of what Nye terms “smart
power”: a clever combination of the tools of conventional hard, or military and
economic, power and soft power. It is this integrated approach that will best
serve India in a complex, interdependent world, which is defined as much by
conflict and competition as it is by cooperation and the need for greater
coordination in confronting common global threats.
The incipient Modi doctrine has five
key elements. First, and most important, is the idea that a strong,
self-reliant and self-confident India will pursue a foreign policy of
“enlightened national interest.” National interest is a contested term;
enlightened national interest even more so. Often national interest is defined
as raison d'état, or “reason of state,” and can be viewed as
the selfish pursuit of national ambitions, mostly as defined by the government
of the day. Enlightened national interest adds a moral prism to the policy.
When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his masterly, Democracy in America,
in the early 19th century, he described enlightened self-interest as that which
made the United States unique: the ability of its citizens to work for the
common good because the pursuit of a better life for everyone serves the
self-interest of all.
In international diplomacy,
enlightened national interest is arguably the recognition that the narrow
pursuit of self-interest in an interdependent world can lead to suboptimal
policy outcomes. In Asia, Japan — a nation Mr. Modi clearly admires — has used
the term enlightened national-interest to define many of its policies,
including those steering its overseas development assistance. Through
supporting other nations via giving and via attractive development funding and
loans, Japan has greatly increased its regional influence. The concept opens up
the possibilities of creating cooperative outcomes for many issues, even those
traditionally seen as difficult, zero-sum conflicts by realists in the
establishment.
An interlinked
neighbourhood
Within the Indian tradition, this
sense of enlightened national-interest is captured in this verse from the Mahopanishad,
“... Ayam˙ bandhurayam˙ ne¯ti ganana¯ laghuce¯tasa¯m uda¯racharita¯nam˙
tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam” or “Only small men discriminate by saying ‘one is
a relative, the other is a stranger. For those who live magnanimously the
entire world constitutes but a family’.” Its essence, it may be recalled, can
be found in the Bharatiya Janata Party’s manifesto as well. And, while Mr. Modi
may not be comfortable with this notion, his idea of enlightened national
interest sits at ease with Nehruvian thinking. After all, it was Jawaharlal
Nehru who believed that while foreign policy must be rooted in a spirit of
realism, it should not be stymied by the narrow realism that lets you look only
at the tip of the nose and little beyond.
Second is the idea that India will
help to build and strengthen a democratic, peaceful, stable and economically
interlinked neighbourhood. This, of course, is not particularly new thinking.
In the past, the Gujral Doctrine was perhaps the strongest articulation of a
policy of reaching out to the neighbourhood, even through gestures that did not
demand reciprocity. What was both novel and encouraging, however, was the
presence of heads of government or senior representatives from all the South
Asian countries at the swearing-in of Mr. Modi and his cabinet, effectively
turning the ceremony into a regional celebration of democracy. In the recent
past, India has not been explicitly seen as a champion of democracy in the
region. Whether or not the strong links in other parts of the world between
mature democracies — and absence of conflict — are mirrored in South Asia, it
is clear that the strengthening of democracy in the region is the first step
toward building what the political scientist, Karl Deutsch, described as a
security community. That is, a region in which the large-scale use of violence
has become unthinkable!
That said, it must be recognised that
only a strong and economically resurgent India can lead the process of South
Asia integration and so much will now depend on how quickly India’s economy can
be revived. Meanwhile, enlightened national interest will demand that India
considers making unilateral gestures to serve longer-term self-interest. For
instance, arriving at an accord on the sharing of the Teesta river with a
stridently India-friendly regime in Bangladesh would clearly be an important
step that should not be undermined by the capricious behaviour of one leader
from West Bengal.
Third is Mr. Modi’s emphasis on soft
power explained though yet another Modi alliteration of 5Ts: trade, tourism,
talent, technology and tradition. For this to translate into reality will
require real effort. For a start, the Ministry of External Affairs will need to
be restructured and every major mission abroad would need to include a trade,
scientific and cultural counsellor knowledgeable in the relevant domains. In
addition, the role of the diaspora in the future development of India has been
emphasised. One clear step that would ensure deeper engagement between India
and the diaspora would be to allow non-resident Indians (NRI) to carry dual
passports. For many Indians, continuing to hold an Indian passport is a badge
of honour which they will not give up for any convenience, glory or money.
Allowing dual citizenship for NRIs carries virtually no additional risk; and
indeed most countries in the world allow their citizens this privilege.
A ‘multi-alignment’
policy
Fourth, the incipient Modi doctrine
moves beyond the former delineation between “non-alignment,” “non-alignment
2.0,” and “alignment” to suggest that India could follow a policy of what Mr.
Shashi Tharoor may describe as “multi-alignment” with all the great powers.
This was emphasised in the President’s address that explicitly stated that the
government will work with China to develop a strategic and cooperative
partnership, work with Japan to build modern infrastructure, build on the firm
foundations of the relations with Russia, pursue the relationship with the
United States with renewed vigour and make concerted efforts to achieve
progress in key areas with the European Union.
Finally, there were only about 50
words of the address devoted to what may have been seen, pre-election, as the
most vital part of a future Modi government’s foreign policy: the willingness
to raise issues of concern at a bilateral level (read Pakistan) and the
uncontroversial claim that stability can be built in the region only if there
is an end to the export of terrorism. Clearly, concerns about Pakistan have
deliberately not been emphasised as this may still be a work in progress. Or
perhaps the Modi government recognises that there is much merit in the adage:
carry a big stick, but speak with a soft voice. For, in the past, as my
colleague Ashok Guha once remarked, “India has carried a toothpick, and shouted
from the roof top and from television studios.”
If the government can deliver on the
promises within the President’s speech, Mr. Modi will make history. If he lets
himself be distracted by divisive social issues or is provoked into adopting
zealous nationalism, he will prove his critics right. As the election results
were announced, I was interviewed by a Chinese Radio station. The first
question they asked me was whether Mr. Modi would be India’s Deng Xiaoping. I
replied tentatively that it was too early to tell and that, in any case, India
was a messy democracy and not an authoritarian state. However, if Mr. Modi does
want to be like an Indian Deng, it is well worth recalling the great Chinese
leader’s “24-Character Strategy”: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope
with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at
maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” In other words, India
requires stability within and peace in our neighbourhood and beyond for at
least the next decade to emerge as a great power of some standing. During that
period it is best not to get dragged into external conflicts, assume leadership
or prominence on the international stage, or attract too much attention. That
is Mr. Modi’s biggest challenge.
