Beyond 1971 war euphoria

Forty years after the creation of Bangladesh, there has been — in the Indian press — an outpouring of euphoria for what many have described as India’s greatest strategic achievement since Independence. And while in military terms it was undoubtedly a major accomplishment, many of the early policy conclusions that followed the war and the India-Pakistan agreement in Shimla in 1972 were proven wrong. In other words, with the benefit of four decades of hindsight, the Bangladesh War may have been a great tactical victory, but the strategic fruits that were to follow, especially, in terms of long-term peace in South Asia are still not on the table.

The humiliating defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 war, the dismemberment of the state, and the Shimla Agreement of 1972 are now widely viewed as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s greatest contribution to the nation. The debates, if any, have focused primarily on the role played by various institutions in creating and executing the policy which resulted, inter alia, in General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the Indian Eastern Army commander accepting the Instrument of Surrender from the head of the Pakistani forces, General A A K Niazi, on December 16, 1971 at Dhaka.

Till a decade or so ago, in many an army mess the roles played by Aurora, General J F R Jacob (the chief of staff, Eastern Command) and the army chief, General (and later Field Marshall) S H F J Manekshaw used to be hotly debated. Jacob has since written his version of the war. Within the intelligence agencies, it is R N Kao, founding head of R&AW who is lionised and the brilliant strategic analyst B Raman has reminded us of the contributions of spymasters whose analysis (and the role played in the creation of the Mukti Bahini) was critical, including the vital inputs of K Sankaran Nair, Brigadier Hassanwalia, Major General Uban, and Gary Saxena. There is also a larger historical debate, which will continue to be played out, on the thinking, planning and objectives of the Indian leadership, and the role-played by the outside powers, especially the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

What has grabbed less attention is the expectations within the establishment about the larger strategic consequences of the 1971 victory and Shimla. There must have been at least three expectations. First that as a consequence of 1971, Pakistan and indeed the entire region would recognise the superiority of Indian military and would be unwilling to take the risk of confronting India. It was hoped that not only would the 1962 debacle of the Chinese war and the stalemate of the Indo-Pak war of 1965 be erased from the collective memory of the region, but that the smaller states would begin to accept the dominant role that India would play in the region to the exclusion of outside states (almost an Indian Monroe doctrine). Second that there would be a settlement of Jammu and Kashmir with the LoC becoming the de facto international border. Indira Gandhi’s then secretary, P N Dhar has confirmed that Z A B Bhutto, then Prime Minister of Pakistan, had agreed to this unwritten understanding at Shimla. And finally that Pakistan as a state would reform itself in at least two ways. One, by accepting that the creation of Bangladesh had proven the fallacy of the two-nation theory and of the role of religion as a binding force for nationhood. Thus it was expected that Pakistan would devolve greater power to the provinces and move beyond Islam as the raison d’être of the state.

Finally, there was the hope that Pakistan and especially the Pakistan army would also transcend its pathological India hostility. To prevent a Versailles type syndrome (the combative nationalism that was witnessed in Germany after its humiliating defeat in the World War I) Indira Gandhi not only treated Bhutto with utmost respect and regard at Shimla, but agreed to repatriate thousands of Pakistani Prisoners of War without any conditions and did not insist on a written agreement on Jammu and Kashmir. P N Haksar, Indira Gandhi’s adviser with a great sense of history apparently was principally instrumental in ensuring that Bhutto went back after Shimla, a hero to his people rather than a discredited leader of a defeated nation.

In retrospect, these expectations were either misplaced or subsequent Indian policies did not build sufficiently on the 1971 and 1972 achievements. Not only was Indian power not recognised in the years after 1971 by Pakistan, but also many of the smaller states, including Sri Lanka, thought of crafty ways of challenging Indian dominance. In the years that followed the assassination of Sheikh Mujib (the father of its independence movement), Bangladesh itself became — in cycles — a source of grave instability for India and was once the favourite hunting ground of ISI agents. The jury, unfortunately, is still out on whether the current bonhomie in bilateral relations will outlast present Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. In Pakistan itself, the Bangladesh War — contrary to Haksar’s hopes — became the new Versailles. The Bangladesh syndrome arguably produced the policy of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’ as avenging 1971 became the principal unstated doctrine of the Pakistan army. Changing borders was no longer taboo, and Bangladesh gave a perverse institutional legitimacy to Pakistan army’s designs to do the same to India.

Religion instead of becoming epithermal to the Pakistani state, overwhelmed it. General Zia-ul-Haq’s years (that followed the military coup against Bhutto) led to a new radicalisation (aided by the Afghan war) and produced a generation of extremists that have permeated into all institutions of the state, including the army. Bhutto himself reneged on any understanding on Jammu and Kashmir that he may had in Shimla, and subsequent leaders of Pakistan helped to create the monster of militancy (aided by our own follies) in J&K that has almost permanently scarred the psyche of the people of the state.

In sum, as we celebrate a milestone in the history of nation — which we hope will be peaceful and prosperous — the Bangladesh syndrome is more than just about victories and agreements. Bangladesh perhaps teaches us that unless political, diplomatic, economic and social initiatives build on military victories, they can remain ephemeral.

(Source: The New Indian Express)

Building block of a new phase in bilateral ties?

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s recent announcement of support for the sale of uranium to India could well be a catalyst for a strategic breakthrough in relations between Canberra and New Delhi. Indeed, while the “uranium decision” may not have a great impact on India’s energy needs, it could have far-reaching consequences for security and strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

While the proposal to export uranium will need to be endorsed at the Australian Labor Party national convention next month, its passage appears to be a mere formality, despite expected opposition from the party’s left wing and autonomous bodies like the Australian Conservation Foundation. With the sale in force, Australia would become the sixth country in the world, following Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Argentina and Namibia, to enter into a formal uranium supply arrangement with India.

What does this new development portend for India’s energy security, especially its ambitious plan to ramp up domestic nuclear power production by more than an order of magnitude in barely two decades, and for the future of India-Australia relations? Nuclear power currently provides approximately four per cent of India’s generation mix, which is dominated by thermal and hydroelectric power, which collectively contribute 90 per cent of the total. India has approximately one per cent of the world’s economically viable reserves of uranium (Australia correspondingly has 40 per cent). Under such circumstances, a sale of uranium to India would make eminent economic sense, were it not for the complexities associated with the downstream uses of uranium.

For India, the immediate benefit of enhanced uranium supplies from Australia would be the supply of high-grade uranium requiring little remediation before use in nuclear reactors. Bilateral trade between the two countries will witness no significant qualitative change. The current trade balance is strongly tilted in Australia’s favour, with coal and gold being the dominant constituents of the export basket to India. All other things remaining the same, the trade difference will only increase in Australia’s favour and is unlikely to change unless value-added products constitute a larger share of India’s exports. All in all, the techno-economic implications for India of uranium supplies from Australia are limited. In addition, the stringent safeguards that Canberra is likely to demand, as part of a bilateral agreement, may invite a political and scientific backlash in India, and New Delhi will — in all likelihood — proceed cautiously.

Does Australia’s decision to sell uranium to India despite the latter’s insistence on not signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty have implications for bilateral ties and the evolving security apparatus in the Asia-Pacific? It needs to be recognised that there are historical moments in every relationship. Decisions taken at those moments can potentially transform a friendship, take it to an unprecedented new level of understanding, and in the process create the momentum for a new phase of deep strategic engagement. The Australia-India relationship has reached just such a moment of renewal and rediscovery.

As yet, despite a growing convergence of values and interests, and having two very competent High Commissioners in place, there is still little real conversation happening between key players in Australia and their counterparts in India. New Delhi and Canberra may know each other, but they still do not have a nuanced understanding of the other. Thus, in the absence of a sustained engagement at multiple levels of opinion and decision makers, even a single issue can derail bilateral ties, as was witnessed during the attacks on Indian students. This needs to change if the two countries have to work with each other in their own mutual interest, and in the interests of the wider region.

Take the case of India. At the official level, there are no more than one or two officers in the severely short-staffed ministry of external affairs who pay attention to Australia, and rarely for more than a couple of hours a week. It requires great persistence for Australian officials and diplomats to secure high-level attention from India, and this lack of real communication even at the government-to-government level does undermine the political relationship.

In Australia, while the problems are different, they are equally debilitating for the relationship. On the one hand, there is undoubtedly a collective desire to see improved relations with India. On the other, Australia is excessively cautious about not offending China as it builds a relationship with India. For instance, Australia’s decision to disconnect from the quadrilateral dialogue with India, Japan and the United States, to assuage Beijing’s nervousness, was arguably short-sighted.

Moreover, the Australian understanding of India, with all its complexities, is severely limited. Till about three decades ago, Australia could claim to be one of the principle centres in the world for the study of India, in various disciplines, and some of the most exciting work on India came from Australian universities. The Subaltern school of scholars is just one example. Not any longer. The study of India in Australia today is in deep decline and little effort is being made to revive departments that had once flourished.

The reality today is that Australia and India have more in common with each other, than perhaps at any time in the past. There is also a greater need and urgency to work with each other. The economic relationship is rapidly growing and will continue to remain robust in the foreseeable future. Strategically, both countries need to work to develop stable and cooperative security architecture for the Asia-Pacific. Such an arrangement would necessarily include China, to ensure that its rise is not disruptive. What has been missing is a “strategic breakthrough”.

A decision by Canberra to sell uranium would symbolically convey to India Australia’s willingness to genuinely invest in the relationship. This could be the building block of a new phase in bilateral ties. More importantly, there needs to be far greater political and intellectual engagement between the two countries. While a new forum for business leaders has been announced, there also needs to be a platform for political leaders and opinion makers from both sides. The Australia-India relationship is an idea whose time has come; it would be a historical tragedy if the leadership of the two countries did not grab this opportunity.

(co-written with Rajeev Anantaram)

(Source: Business Standard)

Time to invest in Indian partnership

THE decision by the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, not to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Perth in October has caused considerable disappointment in Canberra.

The absence of the head of the world's largest democracy, and the Commonwealth's largest member, will take the sheen off the forum and postpone an Indian prime ministerial visit to Australia after more than two decades into the uncertain future.

Commentators have been quick to identify the Labor government's decision not to supply uranium to India as influencing Singh's travel plans. The reality is more complex. Despite a growing convergence of values and interests, and the efforts of our two very competent high commissioners, there is still little real conversation between key players in Australia and their counterparts in India. New Delhi and Canberra may know each other, but they still do not have a nuanced understanding of each other. Thus in the absence of a sustained engagement at many levels, even a single issue can derail bilateral ties. This needs to change if the two countries are to work with each other and in the interests of the region.

Take the case of India. At the official level, there are no more than one or two officers in the severely shortstaffed Ministry of External Affairs who pay attention to Australia, and rarely for more than a couple of hours a week. It requires great persistence for Australian officials and diplomats to secure high-level attention from India.This lack of real communication even at the government-to-government level undermines the political relationship.

A recent private poll of the political and civil service elite in India suggests that while Australia may be a preferred tourist destination, and continues to rank quite highly for the quality of its tertiary education, there are few who would rank Canberra high in terms of political or strategic salience even among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

And, unfortunately, the Cold War divide, Canberra's strident response to India's nuclear tests, and the uranium decision still seem to drive the Indian elite's "limited" understanding of Australia and its potential as an ally.

While the problems are different in Australia, they are equally debilitating for the relationship. On the one hand, there is undoubtedly a collective desire to see improved relations with India; Canberra even had plans to accord Singh the rare honour of addressing both houses of parliament were he to visit the capital after CHOGM.

On the other hand, Australia is excessively cautious of not offending China as it builds a relationship with India. Australia's recent decision to disconnect from the quadrilateral dialogue with India, Japan and the US to assuage Beijing's nervousness was arguably shortsighted.

Moreover, the Australian understanding of India, with all its complexities, is severely limited. Until about three decades ago, Australia could claim to be one of the principal centres in the world for the study of India, in various disciplines, and some of the most exciting work on India came from Australian universities. No longer so. The study of India today is in deep decline and little effort is being made to revive departments that once flourished.

The reality today is that Australia and India have more in common than perhaps at any time in the past, and there is also a greater need and urgency to work together. The economic relationship is booming and will continue to remain robust. Strategically, both countries need to work to develop stable and co-operative security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. Not against Beijing, but with it, to ensure that the peaceful rise of great powers remains peaceful. What is missing is a strategic breakthrough.

There is no doubt that a decision by Canberra to sell uranium would symbolically convey to India Australian willingness to really invest in the relationship. This could be the building block of a new phase in bilateral ties. More importantly, there needs to be much greater engagement between the political and intellectual elites of the two countries. While a new forum for business leaders has been announced, there needs to be a platform for political leaders and opinion-makers from both sides. The Australia-India relationship is an idea whose time has come; it would be a tragedy if the leadership of the two countries prevents this idea from coming to fruition.

(Source: The Australian)

Prof. Mattoo on India-Australia relations...

Prof. Mattoo believes that the idea of a robust India-Australia engagement has come. Watch the full interview here...

Mumbai terror attack may signal dangerous game

THE terror attacks in Mumbai on Wednesday are likely to end the recent thaw in India-Pakistan relations and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's hopes of a grand reconciliation in South Asia.

As yet no organisation has claimed responsibility but if elements within Pakistan's fractured establishment are linked to the attacks, it will suggest Islamabad, and particularly the army, is keen to prove it is not just an outpost for Washington in the region. Pakistan's demonstration of its autonomy, and the army's attempts at recovering its prestige through such dangerous tactical ploys, is also fraught with consequences for Afghanistan and the possibility of an early closure to the endgame being played in that country.

The attacks in Mumbai are the worst on Indian soil since the 2008 attacks on the same city that brought the financial capital of the country to a standstill for several days.

There is good evidence the 2008 attacks were carried out by members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist organisation with strong links to Pakistan's main intelligence organisation, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

Even after 2008 the LET has continued to threaten India and it has deep links with the Indian mujahideen, who have carried out crude attacks in several parts of India.

The timing of the present attacks suggests Pakistan's military establishment is reasserting itself within the country and in terms of its most critical external relationships. Better relations with India have rarely been on the agenda of Pakistan's military, which owes its raison d'etre to hostility with India.

Indeed, the army and the ISI have grown into being an empire within a state precisely because of the enmity with India and are, therefore, deeply suspicious of a detente with India.

For nearly three years since the 2008 terrorist attacks, relations between the two hostile neighbours have remained fragile and have eased only because of the unprecedented diplomatic generosity of Singh, despite little domestic support.

India has been faced with a catch-22 situation. Almost all terrorist attacks in India, over the past two decades, have been supported or sponsored by Pakistan, and often -- there is good evidence to suggest -- by elements from within the establishment in Pakistan. And yet only by engaging and strengthening critical stakeholders in Pakistan, who are fighting the battle against extremism internally, will it become possible to reconstruct a moderate Pakistan that is a force for stability in the region.

Given that the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan were expected to meet in New Delhi towards the end of this month, and there was the possibility of a summit towards the end of the year, it was obviously critical for the terrorists and their supporters to strike now to ensure a deeply weakened Indian Prime Minister is unlikely to invest any further political capital in the relationship.

Moreover, Pakistan's military establishment has found its internal legitimacy floundering after the American attack on Abbottabad in which Osama bin Laden was killed.

The army has faced flak from civil society, from parliamentarians, and the generals have faced growing dissent from within the ranks of the armed forces in a country where anti-Americanism is widespread. Indeed almost every survey of public opinion suggests Barack Obama has less support than bin Laden in most parts of Pakistan.

In addition, Washington has recently suspended $800 million of military assistance to Pakistan. Clearly, Pakistan's army leadership is fighting a grave battle for its legitimacy and continued survival.

In a larger geo-political sense, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai follow the killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the powerful leader of Kandahar province in Afghanistan, and half-brother of President Hamid Karzai. It is widely believed the killing was carried out to ensure the chances of reconciliation in Afghanistan are further thwarted.

It is clear Pakistan's army has been subverting efforts at building a more inclusive governance structure in Afghanistan and also ensuring that any dialogue with the Taliban is channelled through the military headquarters in Rawalpindi.

In other words, there is evidence of a new deeply disturbing pattern that suggests Pakistan's army and ISI have embarked on an adventurous, dangerous course to regain their legitimacy domestically and their autonomy vis a vis Washington.

The attacks in Mumbai and Wali Karzai's assassination may the first signposts of what could be the beginning of a new great game in South Asia.

(Source: The Australian)

Prof. Mattoo in Berlin

Prof. Mattoo, a member of the Governing Council of Pugwash, co-chaired the Plenary Session on Improving Relations Between India and Pakistan, at the recently concluded 59th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs held at Berlin, Germany from 1-4 July 2011.

Here he is seen with Lt. Gen (retd) Talat Masood, Hon. Sherry Rehman, MP and former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Hon. Ahsan Iqbal Chaudhry, MP, Pakistan, Prof. Saifuddin Soz, MP Rajya Sabha and Hon. Syed Azeez Pasha, MP Rajya Sabha.

Prof. Mattoo @ The Festival of Ideas, University of Melbourne

In the recently concluded Festival of Ideas 2011 organized by the University of Melbourne and supported by the Australia-India Institute, Prof. Mattoo chaired a session on India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The panel included Dr. Christopher Snedden, Deakin University, Prof. Robin Jeffrey, National University of Singapore, Prof. Samina Yasmeen, The University of Western Australia and Ms Sally Neighbour from The Australian. The speakers debated, discussed, analyzed and contemplated on the key question: How can peace be assured between these conflicting national identities and states?

To watch the entire session, click on the link below:

http://live.unimelb.edu.au/episode/2011-festival-ideas-india-pakistan-and-afghanistan

Wait and watch, and suffer

Few incidents can exemplify the deep turmoil within Pakistan than the murder of the investigative reporter, Syed Saleem Shahzad. Part of a brave and often audacious community of journalists in Pakistan, Shahzad was targeted apparently because he exposed links between al-Qaeda and key parts of the Pakistani establishment, a nexus that has acquired a new salience since the killing of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad. It is critical, at virtually this eleventh hour, that Pakistan’s people, and the world outside — the country’s friends and even foes — coalesce to forge a common agenda for the future of the country.

While the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s angst-ridden recent visit to Islamabad may suggest a new urgency, Washington’s policies continue to be driven by short-term considerations of political expediency, especially the need to secure the Pakistan army’s support to ensure an early exit out of Afghanistan. What is often not recognised is that today the second-largest Muslim State, with the fastest growing nuclear arsenal, is confronting the most serious challenge to its existence as a coherent nation-state probably since independence and certainly since Bangladesh separated from it in 1971.

Five fundamental questions, and the manner in which the people of Pakistan and their leaders respond to these almost-Manichean choices, will determine — to a large extent — the future of the country.

First, will the idea of Pakistan, as a nation-state, remain rooted in the world view of its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah or will it continue to be driven by the ideology of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled the country from 1977 to 1988? Let us be clear that Jinnah demanded Pakistan as a home for the Muslim minority of the Indian subcontinent, but having secured a separate State wanted religion to become a private affair, with little role in public life. While we may quibble over Jinnah’s view on religion, there is no doubt that he had hoped that the country would become a modern and moderate Muslim State. In contrast, the deep Islamic radicalisation of parts of Pakistan, and its descent into extremism, is a product of Zia’s political machinations aided by the US and its allies during the Cold War.

Second, will Pakistan’s army seek to cement the fractured nation or will itself become a source of further splintering? Pakistan’s army has, for decades, been seen as the most professional, well integrated, disciplined, least corrupt and most powerful institution in the country. And yet today it is clear that it is the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate that has sponsored many of the militant groups that are deeply undermining the stability of Pakistan. It is the army again that has the strongest vested interest in continuing conflict with India; given that it is this rivalry that has allowed it to expand to a point where it’s become an empire within a State. In turn, the army’s credibility has been deeply eroded among the vast majority of the people. Will the army permanently disconnect itself from the jihadis and cleanse itself of radical subversive elements within its ranks or will it preside over Pakistan’s collapse into anarchy?

Third, will the relationship with the US be based on a convergence of long-term values and interests or will it continue to be based on tactical opportunism? No other external relationship has been as important to Pakistan as the relationship with the US. It is also one of the highest recipients of American aid. And yet there are few countries that are more unpopular in Pakistan than the US. Almost every survey of public opinion suggests that Barack Obama has less support than bin Laden in most parts of Pakistan. The belief that America treats Pakistan like a condom, to be used and discarded, is all pervasive and unless this traditionally patron-client relationship transforms itself, anti-Americanism will continue to inspire further radicalisation of the polity and the society.

Fourth, will there be a grand reconciliation with India or will the historical legacy of enmity over the past 60-odd years continue to dominate south Asia? If there is a silver bullet that could almost miraculously transform Pakistan, it would be reconciliation with India. The India-Pakistan relationship is, and has been, about almost everything that matters: history, memory, prejudice, territory, identity, religion, sovereignty, ideology, insecurity, trust, betrayal and much, much more. While India’s size and the scale of its economy has prevented the conflict with its western neighbour from clouding its future, Pakistan has been strangulated by the rivalry with a vast majority of its resources being spent on matching India’s considerable military prowess. Ironically, there is no prime minister more willing to make peace with Pakistan than India’s Manmohan Singh, even to the extent of making unilateral concessions, wherever needed to satisfy Pakistan’s hardliners. Will Pakistan grab this opportunity in its own self-interest?

Fifth, will the media, the judiciary and the institutions of civil society grow and expand their influence or will they be also squeezed into inertia? Pakistan’s greatest strength, in recent years, has been the growth of a robust and fiercely independent media, and its brave and often audacious NGO community (including a significant human rights and women’s movement). They have been the biggest bulwark against Pakistan’s otherwise imminent collapse into Talibanism. The influence exercised by these groups will be an important determinant of Pakistan’s future.

Pakistan’s friends must understand that its future will be primarily determined by the manner in which it addresses these questions, most of which have been plaguing it since its independence as a separate nation-state. And the best service they can do to help Pakistan is to make its leaders recognise not just the gravity of the crises that they are facing, but to ensure that they reflect on these questions and chart out a course based on an honest assessment of what is good for the country. The world, including India, can no longer afford to just wait and watch.

(Source: Hindustan Times)