
To watch the entire session, click on the link below:
http://live.unimelb.edu.au/episode/2011-festival-ideas-india-pakistan-and-afghanistan
From Kashmir to Kew: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally!
Few incidents can exemplify the deep turmoil within Pakistan than the murder of the investigative reporter, Syed Saleem Shahzad. Part of a brave and often audacious community of journalists in Pakistan, Shahzad was targeted apparently because he exposed links between al-Qaeda and key parts of the Pakistani establishment, a nexus that has acquired a new salience since the killing of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad. It is critical, at virtually this eleventh hour, that Pakistan’s people, and the world outside — the country’s friends and even foes — coalesce to forge a common agenda for the future of the country.
While the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s angst-ridden recent visit to Islamabad may suggest a new urgency, Washington’s policies continue to be driven by short-term considerations of political expediency, especially the need to secure the Pakistan army’s support to ensure an early exit out of Afghanistan. What is often not recognised is that today the second-largest Muslim State, with the fastest growing nuclear arsenal, is confronting the most serious challenge to its existence as a coherent nation-state probably since independence and certainly since Bangladesh separated from it in 1971.
Five fundamental questions, and the manner in which the people of Pakistan and their leaders respond to these almost-Manichean choices, will determine — to a large extent — the future of the country.
First, will the idea of Pakistan, as a nation-state, remain rooted in the world view of its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah or will it continue to be driven by the ideology of the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, who ruled the country from 1977 to 1988? Let us be clear that Jinnah demanded Pakistan as a home for the Muslim minority of the Indian subcontinent, but having secured a separate State wanted religion to become a private affair, with little role in public life. While we may quibble over Jinnah’s view on religion, there is no doubt that he had hoped that the country would become a modern and moderate Muslim State. In contrast, the deep Islamic radicalisation of parts of Pakistan, and its descent into extremism, is a product of Zia’s political machinations aided by the US and its allies during the Cold War.
Second, will Pakistan’s army seek to cement the fractured nation or will itself become a source of further splintering? Pakistan’s army has, for decades, been seen as the most professional, well integrated, disciplined, least corrupt and most powerful institution in the country. And yet today it is clear that it is the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate that has sponsored many of the militant groups that are deeply undermining the stability of Pakistan. It is the army again that has the strongest vested interest in continuing conflict with India; given that it is this rivalry that has allowed it to expand to a point where it’s become an empire within a State. In turn, the army’s credibility has been deeply eroded among the vast majority of the people. Will the army permanently disconnect itself from the jihadis and cleanse itself of radical subversive elements within its ranks or will it preside over Pakistan’s collapse into anarchy?
Third, will the relationship with the US be based on a convergence of long-term values and interests or will it continue to be based on tactical opportunism? No other external relationship has been as important to Pakistan as the relationship with the US. It is also one of the highest recipients of American aid. And yet there are few countries that are more unpopular in Pakistan than the US. Almost every survey of public opinion suggests that Barack Obama has less support than bin Laden in most parts of Pakistan. The belief that America treats Pakistan like a condom, to be used and discarded, is all pervasive and unless this traditionally patron-client relationship transforms itself, anti-Americanism will continue to inspire further radicalisation of the polity and the society.
Fourth, will there be a grand reconciliation with India or will the historical legacy of enmity over the past 60-odd years continue to dominate south Asia? If there is a silver bullet that could almost miraculously transform Pakistan, it would be reconciliation with India. The India-Pakistan relationship is, and has been, about almost everything that matters: history, memory, prejudice, territory, identity, religion, sovereignty, ideology, insecurity, trust, betrayal and much, much more. While India’s size and the scale of its economy has prevented the conflict with its western neighbour from clouding its future, Pakistan has been strangulated by the rivalry with a vast majority of its resources being spent on matching India’s considerable military prowess. Ironically, there is no prime minister more willing to make peace with Pakistan than India’s Manmohan Singh, even to the extent of making unilateral concessions, wherever needed to satisfy Pakistan’s hardliners. Will Pakistan grab this opportunity in its own self-interest?
Fifth, will the media, the judiciary and the institutions of civil society grow and expand their influence or will they be also squeezed into inertia? Pakistan’s greatest strength, in recent years, has been the growth of a robust and fiercely independent media, and its brave and often audacious NGO community (including a significant human rights and women’s movement). They have been the biggest bulwark against Pakistan’s otherwise imminent collapse into Talibanism. The influence exercised by these groups will be an important determinant of Pakistan’s future.
Pakistan’s friends must understand that its future will be primarily determined by the manner in which it addresses these questions, most of which have been plaguing it since its independence as a separate nation-state. And the best service they can do to help Pakistan is to make its leaders recognise not just the gravity of the crises that they are facing, but to ensure that they reflect on these questions and chart out a course based on an honest assessment of what is good for the country. The world, including India, can no longer afford to just wait and watch.
(Source: Hindustan Times)
To listen to the interview, click on the following link…
http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/rn/podcast/2011/04/sea_20110416_0805.mp3
It has been clear for many months now that the lack of a sustained Indian engagement with Pakistan has proved to be counterproductive, fruitless and even dangerous. The prospects, for instance, of an early prosecution of those responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks or a clampdown on the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba haven’t improved because of our so-called policy of coercive non-engagement. Instead, the growing fragility of a nuclear-armed Pakistan is potentially a source of instability across the subcontinent.
There are renewed expectations, therefore, that the discussions early next week between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan (on the sidelines of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation meeting in Bhutan) will lead to a sustained dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh understands and appreciates the importance of reconciling with Pakistan — troubled and turbulent as it may be — and it would be tragic if what could have become the most important legacy of his current tenure is abandoned because of a perceived public backlash.
Indeed, the importance of reconnecting was brought out at the Chaophraya dialogue organised by New Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in partnership with former Pakistani federal minister Sherry Rehman’s Jinnah Institute, which brought a group of Indian and Pakistani analysts together in Bangkok recently.
This was not a meeting of bleeding heart liberals. The Indian group consisted of mostly hard-nosed realists who were driven not by some latent atavistic desire for reconciliation but by the challenge of negotiating with a deeply unstable, nuclear-armed neighbour that is increasingly being inflamed by extremist fires. Similarly, the group of Pakistanis, included those who recognised the existential challenge that their country was facing, but were not rosy-eyed about India or India’s policies.
The fact that a group like this was able to arrive at a joint declaration suggests that there is now a growing consensus on the importance of a dialogue within the strategic communities of the two countries. More critically, there was an unequivocal reaffirmation of PM Singh’s long-term vision of India-Pakistan relations as one where borders can’t be changed but can eventually be made irrelevant and of a South Asia that is economically and socially integrated.
Three other aspects of the dialogue could serve as a template for the forthcoming official talks: first, while the present government in Islamabad had initially disconnected itself from policies followed under former President Pervez Musharraf, there is now a rethink in terms of the work done during those years, especially in terms of resolving contentious bilateral issues with India. There is more or less acceptance that the only resolution of Jammu and Kashmir has to be on the basis of non-territorial settlement by converting the Line of Control into a line of peace. There is also agreement that the back channel that dealt with this issue needs to be activated and it can further build on the Singh-Musharraf understanding in this area.
Second, there was a consensus that there should be an uninterrupted and uninterruptible dialogue on issues of strategic and nuclear stability. It was recognised that the region is endangered by the absence of robust crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms. There was unanimity on the need to set up a bilateral study group for this purpose. It was also felt that it was essential to review the efficacy of existing confidence-building measures and explore additional declaratory, unilateral, and mutually agreed to nuclear confidence-building measures and nuclear risk-reduction measures. No less importantly, it was recognised that there was great need for a discussion among China, India and Pakistan to promote strategic stability with a focus on the logic of sufficiency of nuclear arsenals.
Third, there was a consensus on the need to fight terrorism and extremism. Pakistani participants didn’t shy away from admitting the great danger posed by extremism to the survival of their State and societies and the need to ensure that State institutions are not eroded by extremism. They also emphasised the need to initiate an institutionalised and regular dialogue between the intelligence agencies and believed that it was imperative that there be a continuous exchange of information on incidents of terrorism and about the activities of terrorist organisations.
The Chaophraya dialogue suggests that there is a process of deep churning taking place within Pakistan’s fragmented political and social structure. While the rising tide of extremism and fanaticism is most visible, there is a growing movement of those willing to battle for ‘the heart and soul’ of Pakistan and reconstruct the State — in keeping with Jinnah’s original vision — as Muslim, moderate and modern. It’s also been clear for some years now that India is unable to comprehend or address the complexities of a changing Pakistan. Not surprisingly, New Delhi’s policies have floundered, if not failed. Strident debates in the Indian media, frightening in their Manichaean simplicity, reflect a lack of appreciation of the intricacies of the Gordian knot of bilateral relations. Robust if differentiated, focused but flexible, multi-track responses must define India’s grand strategy towards Pakistan.
As finance minister of India, Singh led the process of economic reforms. In his first term as PM, Singh risked the survival of his government by agreeing to a nuclear deal with the US. By freeing the country from the regime of technology-related sanctions, India also mainstreamed itself as a nuclear power. The PM must use the rest of his current term in office to free India from the heavy burden of its 60-odd-year-old belligerent relationship with Pakistan. That alone will strengthen his standing as a statesman and restore the credibility of his government.
(Source: Hindustan Times)