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Quiet mission

Words Words Words: Adventures in Diplomacy, T.P. Sreenivasan, Pearson Longman

The term ‘candid and honest diplomat’ appears to be an oxymoron. After all, diplomacy is the art of being discreet and lying for your country. Post-retirement, however, many diplomats suddenly seem to turn cathartic, finally giving vent to long-suppressed opinions.

Diplomatic memoirs the world over often border on the scandalous. This, however, is not the case with Ambassador Sreenivasan and Words Words Words: Adventures in Diplomacy.

Sreenivasan appears to have been a gentleman diplomat, a rare breed. And this is a gentleman’s book.

No major scandals, no great revelations, but an interesting read nonetheless. The initial pages are devoted to encapsulating the author’s life, from his childhood in Kayamkulam in Kerala to his retirement as India’s ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna.

The rest of the book deals with the challenges Sreenivasan faced during his career. As he points out: “Two military coups, two expulsions and two broken limbs in an armed attack are not the stuff that diplomatic dreams are made of.

But there was abundant recompense for them in the 37 years in the IFS. I walked in and out of the White House and the Kremlin, worked in the United Nations, broke bread with the high and the mighty, encountered celebrities, presented credentials to more than 10 heads of state and spoke for a billion people for India on a variety of issues.”

The chapter “Nuclear Winter, Kargil Spring”, which deals with Indo-US relations in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, is insightful.

The author played a significant role in mending relations with the US Congress. One wishes, however, that Sreenivasan was more expansive with his “insider” knowledge on men and matters.

 (Source: India Today, 29/11/07)

WINNER ALL THE WAY

India’s foreign policy and strategic community has never been short of talent. But there are few, in recent years, who can claim to have been such a master ofrealpolitik as Jyotinder Nath Dixit. In his passing away, India has lost, undoubtedly, one of its most skilled craftsmen of foreign policy and diplomacy and the UPA government, a formidable pillar of strength.

When I met ?Mani? Dixit in his office in the PMO last week, it was clear that he had become one of the closest confidantes of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on security and foreign policy. Mani Dixit was India?s principal negotiator with China on the border question and the main back channel with Pakistan. He was also, most critically, formulating aspects of the country?s new military and, especially, nuclear doctrine. In addition, he was helping the handling of the crisis created by the tsunami, and was in constant touch with the top political leadership in Washington and Moscow.

As Mani Dixit discussed his new responsibilities with me, there was no doubt that he had the mental agility of a young mind at its peak: sharp and incisive, as ever. But it was also clear that his body was tired, and, quite frankly, he looked exhausted. When I pointed this out, he gave my concerns short shrift: ?I have returned to office after ten years, and I am working fourteen hours every day. And, by god, I am enjoying it!? And there can be no question, Mani Dixit enjoyed power and authority and knew how to exercise it.

But what made J.N. Dixit so special? Dixit simply stood out for his ability to clinically and non-ideologically, even amorally, take a view of security and foreign policy issues, even issues where passions and emotions ran high. This was particularly remarkable because Dixit grew in a foreign policy establishment that was steeped in Nehruvian idealism and all the associated shibboleths and slogans. And yet Dixit, as it became obvious, was never bound by dogmas or a rigid ideological framework either as foreign secretary or, more daringly later, as a member of the Congress party. Only India mattered! With the other Chanakya, the then prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, Dixit steered India?s foreign policy in the early Nineties through the stormiest waters that India had known since independence. Recall that India?s closest ally, the Soviet Union, had collapsed, Kashmir was boiling, and economically the country was almost bankrupt. It was the nuanced strategy of economic and political pragmatism and tactical diplomatic manoeuvring unleashed by Rao and Dixit that helped the country reach calmer waters.

Indeed, India?s nuclear option was saved during those bleak days by the astuteness of men like Dixit. It had become essential for India to engage the United States of America on the nuclear issue, but it was critical not to succumb to pressure from the non-proliferation Ayatollahs of Washington. The strategy was simple: buy time so as to be able to exercise the nuclear option when the country was not economically or politically so vulnerable. As Dixit later recounted, on a lighter note: ?In March 1992, I was in Washington for the first round of Indo-US bilateral. My principal interlocutor was Ambassador Lehman, director of the US Arms Control Agency, pushing us on the nuclear question. He said his piece in somewhat admonitory terms. I chanted India?s ?we will not sign the NPT come what may? mantra at him in response. Lehman got perturbed: ?But your Prime Minister has agreed that you will talk to us bilaterally to work out areas of agreement from which progress can be made?. I told him it was absolutely right and that we had already initiated some exchanges. And then, Lehman said: ?We will continue talks, Mr Dixit. But if you are planning to play games, there is a threshold beyond which we will not allow you to continue.? I replied: ?When games are played one side loses, the other side wins and at times, Ambassador Lehman, losers even after losing remain fairly convinced about the excellence of their moves in the game.? End of conversation.?

But Dixit, despite his apparent rigidity was willing to adopt and accept new options under changed circumstances. This was the essence of his realism. He opened the much-needed window to Israel surmounting the opposition from the pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian lobby at home. During his tenure as foreign secretary, he began a process of engaging the military junta in Myanmar as a way of balancing the Chinese influence, despite opposition from human rights groups and from friends of Aung San Suu Kyi.

In recent days, he was even prepared to think out of the box on Kashmir. In questioning orthodox positions, Dixit was willing to be unpopular even at the risk of alienating the influential and the powerful. As a young journalist in the early Nineties, I once interviewed Dixit on the Kashmir issue. He revealed, in what he thought was an off-the-record backgrounder, that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi had agreed to converting the LoC into the international border at Shimla at 1972, and this was probably the way forward. In my naivet?, I published the story, creating a minor storm, which, of course, Dixit weathered without much damage. And he never held it against me.

Dixit, undoubtedly, had the courage to be forthright, even blunt, as only those who are self-made can be. And although Dixit never had a godfather, he patronized a large number of younger diplomats and scholars. Indeed, he invited passionate loyalty from his juniors and friends, many of whom owed their spectacular success to him. In many ways Dixit was larger than life, in terms of his ideas and in the way he lived his life. Behind his office desk were a series of pipes that he smoked from. It was as if each pipe was a metaphor for a new thinking cap, which would provoke him to be different and think differently from ordinary mortals or mediocre diplomats.

(Source: The Telegraph, 04/01/05)

An agenda for a new Kashmir

JAMMU AND Kashmir rarely opens up to new opportunities. In the last 13 years, the window has opened only twice. After the 1996 election, the National Conference Government could have, had it acted with greater wisdom and maturity, translated the electoral verdict into sustainable political peace and economic stability on the ground. And yet, as we know, the NC squandered that popular expectation because of its cavalier attitude. The 2002 Assembly election has pushed the window almost fully open. The new People's Democratic Party-Congress coalition Government has a real chance to channelise the people's vote for peace and prosperity into the construction of a "naya" Kashmir. And yet, as we know from past experience, the window could quite as easily shut back and it may take years before a new opening can be made.

The unfortunate political differences between the PDP and the Congress over the creation of a coalition Government for the first 15 days after the declaration of results had begun to scar the popular psyche. And yet, this scar will vanish if the new Government addresses the real hurts and hopes of the people of the State. Indeed, if the delay has resulted in a firmer commitment to a common minimum programme and in the determination to make a real difference, the loss of a fortnight may begin to be recognised, in retrospect, as a blessing in disguise.

The common minimum programme is an imaginative document, but the focus of attention should be both on short-term and medium-measures that can generate and sustain a process of change. The first hundred days must be used for assuaging the hurt of the average resident of the State and in making powerful gestures and signals, but the period beyond the first few months must be employed in making a significant difference to the quality of life of everyone in Jammu and Kashmir. In the 1940s, the National Conference, supported by the Congress, released its Naya Kashmir Manifesto: a document that electrified the State and transformed Jammu and Kashmir's politics, economics and society. There is a chance now for the new coalition Government to do the same in the first years of the 21st century.

Three short-term measures are self-evident. First, it is critical to build on the sentiment against violence and in favour of democratic processes. In Jammu and Kashmir today, there is an overwhelming sentiment against violence, irrespective of its origin or intent. Militancy may not be down and out, but it has lost its popular legitimacy. A large number of credible field surveys and opinion polls reveal that over 90 per cent of the Kashmiri people "disapprove" of violence. The elections too demonstrated that a large section of the Kashmiris is once again willing to give democracy a chance.

This widespread feeling can sustain itself only if people are empowered to more actively fight those who spread violence and terror in their name. This can only happen if there is an opening up of the political and civil space, by making the people rather than the security agencies the real bulwark against terrorism. While this may suggest a need to adopt radical measures, what is required is a gradual approach. Let there be a glasnost for the Kashmiri people, but care must be taken that this freedom is not used by external forces that are seeking to once again victimise the Kashmiris.

Second, it is vital to be as inclusive as possible and begin a dialogue with even those who may have stayed away from the election. It is clear that the PDP has won considerable support in the Valley, and the Congress has the mandate of the people from Jammu. But there are groups and individuals who supported others, or who were unwilling to participate in the elections. The main political groups in Ladakh and the separatists in Kashmir are just two examples. Including these groups in a dialogue is essential if the democratic process has to be carried forward, and their non-inclusion in the shaping of a new Kashmir may provide them with few incentives not to be subversive. Indeed, practical politics and political magnanimity, admittedly in rare supply these days, demand that even the NC is not excluded from such a process.

Finally, it is essential to meaningfully engage the rest of India including the Central Government. The State Government cannot hope to rebuild Kashmir in isolation; it requires a massive concerted effort of the Indian nation. It must be recognised that there is a growing sentiment within Indian civil society and powerful sections of the Central Government that partisan or sectarian agendas cannot be allowed to dictate policies towards Jammu and Kashmir. This feeling can only be tapped, however, if the State Government adopts an accommodationist rather than a confrontational agenda. The Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to be "generous" and go the extra mile. This should now reflect in its overall approach towards the State.

The medium-term agenda for the State must be focussed on that over-used but still relevant cliche: providing good governance. But reaching out to the people in Jammu and Kashmir must not become an excuse for providing sops and adopting populist measures. In fact, there are four essential pre-requisites for ensuring good governance in Jammu and Kashmir. One, a strong and stable economic infrastructure that can unleash the entrepreneurial potential of the people of the State as well as generate employment. Two, an accountable, streamlined and people-sensitive administrative machinery. Three, a speedy grievance redressal system that that includes an upright and effective Judiciary. Four, a revival of Kashmir's traditionally tolerant society and its expression in the form of Kashmiriyat. All four have been absent in the State for most of the last decade. Only if these are in place can we hope for an economically viable and politically and socially stable Jammu and Kashmir.

Finally, it is critical that the rest of India recognises the importance of Jammu and Kashmir and the urgent need to rebuild it. Jammu and Kashmir's uniqueness is obvious for a variety of historical reasons recognised even by the Supreme Court. More important, however, is Kashmir's singular importance to the very idea of India, which is often forgotten, that must now re-enter the consciousness of the political elite. A Muslim majority state that voluntarily acceded to India in 1947 lent tremendous strength to the construction of India as a vibrant, secular and pluralistic state. The battle, therefore, to recover the trust of the Kashmiri people is critical not just for the recovery of the ideals that inspired Indian nationhood, but also central to the war against obscurantism.

In other words, there must be a realisation that Kashmir must no longer be dealt with the kind of political ineptitude and bureaucratic inertia that has often characterised New Delhi's policies towards many other States over the last decades.

(Source: The Hindu, 28/10/02)